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JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to § 
78-3-4 of the Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Did the Utah trial court err in transferring jurisdiction to the Georgia trial court 
under the Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) and 
the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 (PKPA)? This issue is preserved 
in the Mr. Kingdon's Motion to Continue Jurisdiction and Objection to Relinquishment 
of Jurisdiction. 
II. Did the trial court fail to follow statutory requirements when it did not allow 
the Mr. Kingdon opportunity to be heard before making its determination regarding 
jurisdiction? Mr. Kingdon had no opportunity to raise this issue in the trial court before 
the court had already made its decision regarding jurisdiction. 
III. Did the trial court fail to make any findings to support its conclusion that 
Georgia is the proper forum to hear this case? Mr. Kingdon had no opportunity to raise 
this issue in the trial court before the final order was entered. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATE STATUTES 
The Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-45c-101 etseq. 
The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C.A., § 1738A. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal concerning proper jurisdiction of a child custody matter. Over the 
objection of the Mr. Kingdon, the Honorable Judge Roger A. Livingston of the Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, vacated a child custody modification 
entered by the Third District Court and transferred jurisdiction of the case to the Superior 
Court of Mcintosh County, Georgia. 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
The parties to the proceedings were divorced in the state of Kansas in 1989, and 
custody of their two minor children, Julie Marie Kingdon and Stacie Marie Kingdon, was 
awarded to Mrs. Kingdon. (R. 13, 17) Both Mr. and Mrs. Kingdon left the state of 
Kansas in 1989, and neither has resided in Kansas since then. (R. 178) 
Although Mrs. Kingdon was awarded custody of the minor children, both girls lived 
with Mr. Kingdon by mutual consent of the parties for substantial periods of time in the 
years following the divorce. (R. 54; see also Georgia Custody Hearing included in the 
Addendum [hereinafter cited as "Ga. Hearing"] p. 20, 41-44) 
In June of 2001, Mr. Kingdon filed a Motion to Enforce Visitation with the Kansas 
court that had entered the initial child custody order, alleging that Mrs. Kingdon had 
interfered with his summer visitation with the girls. (R. 282-283) On June 27, 2001, 
Judge Meryl Wilson of the Kansas court dismissed the motion based on the finding that 
the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, had assumed jurisdiction of 
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the matter. (R. 282-283) On June 29, 2001, Mr. Kingdon filed a second Motion to 
Enforce Visitation, this time with the Third Judicial District Court. (R. 150-154) The 
matter went into mediation, and no subsequent hearing was held by the Court regarding 
the visitation matter. (R. 176) 
On June 5, 2002, Mr. Kingdon filed a Verified Petition for Modification of Child 
Custody in the Third District Court. (R. 177-181) The Petition was for split custody of 
the children, based upon a material and substantial change of living circumstances. (R. 
179) The modification was stipulated to by the parties. (R. 184-185, 196). 
On June 11, 2002, the Third District Court entered its Order Modifying Child 
Custody, awarding custody of Julie to Mrs. Kingdon, and custody of Stacie to Mr. 
Kingdon. (R. 201-203) At the time the order was entered, Julie was living with her 
mother in Georgia, and Stacie had lived with her father in Utah for nearly 11 months 
(since July 17,2001). (R. 197) 
On June 4, 2002, Stacie flew from Utah to Georgia to visit her mother, ostensibly for 
a one-month visit, with a return flight scheduled for July 1, 2002. (R. 208-209, 212) 
Shortly before Stacie's scheduled return, however, Mrs. Kingdon informed Mr. Kingdon 
that she refused to return Stacie as planned, notwithstanding a change of custody had 
already occurred. (R. 207) When Mrs. Kingdon failed to send Stacie back on the 
scheduled date, Mr. Kingdon filed a Motion for Writ of Assistance on July 3, 2002, 
requesting the Court's assistance in having Stacie returned to Utah. (R. 215-216). That 
same day (July 3rd), Mr. Kingdon appeared personally before Judge Livingston of the 
Third Judicial District Court. (R. 214) Judge Livingston denied Mr. Kingdon5 s Motion 
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for a Writ of Assistance, and noted that he would consider setting a hearing when all 
parties could be present for the issues to be heard. (R. 214) 
On July 3, 2002, Mrs. Kingdon filed a Petition for Change of Custody and a Motion 
for Ex Parte Relief in the Superior Court of Mcintosh County, Georgia, alleging that 
Stacie had been subject to abuse while in Utah. (R. 221-225, 239-243) 
After Mr. Kingdon was served with a copy of Mrs. Kingdon's Petition for Change of 
Custody through the Georgia court, he filed a motion on July 19, 2002, in the Third 
District Court asking the Court to continue its jurisdiction and objecting to any 
relinquishment of said jurisdiction. (R. 250-255) On an unknown date, prior to receiving 
Mr. Kingdon's objection to relinquishment of jurisdiction, Judge Livingston conferred 
with Judge Robert L. Russell of the Macintosh County Superior Court, and the judges 
agreed that Georgia should assume jurisdiction of the case (R. 268, 287) 
Mr. Kingdon later requested the Third Judicial District Court to produce a record of 
the aforementioned telephone conversation between Judge Livingston and Judge Russell. 
(R. 284-285) On Oct. 4, 2002, the Court indicated that its record of communication with 
the Georgia Court consisted of the Minute Entry (and final order regarding jurisdiction) 
dated July 30, 2002. (R. 291) 
C. DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
On July 30, 2002, the Honorable Judge Roger A. Livingston of the Third Judicial 
District Court made a signed Minute Entry in which he ordered the following: 
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(a) That the prior child custody modification order entered by the Court on June 11, 
2002, awarding custody of the minor child, Stacie Kingdon, to her father be vacated. (R. 
268) 
(b) That jurisdiction of the case be transferred to the State of Georgia. (R.268) 
D. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The original child custody order for this case was entered in the State of Kansas, 
where custody of both children was awarded to Mrs. Kingdon (R. 17) Shortly thereafter, 
all parties to that order left Kansas and lost significant connection to that state. (R. 178) 
With the exception of changes to child support obligation, no other state modified the 
Kansas order until Utah entered the split custody order of June 11, 2002, awarding 
custody of Julie Kingdon to her mother, and Stacie Kingdon to her father. (R. 196-199, 
201-202) 
In June 2001, the Kansas court, in fact, refused to hear a dispute between the parties 
concerning visitation, based on its finding that the Third Judicial District Court of Salt 
Lake County, Utah, had assumed jurisdiction. (R. 282-283) Although Mrs. Kingdon and 
both girls lived in Georgia at the time, Mrs. Kingdon chose to use the Utah court system 
to mediate the matter. (R. 176). She also signed a consent to the personal jurisdiction of 
the Utah court when she agreed to the split custody arrangement. (R. 184-185) 
Since the original order was entered in Kansas and the parties left the state at the end 
of 1989, Mr. Kingdon is a long-term resident of the State of Utah. (R. 197). His 
residency status has not changed during the course of the custody dispute. (R. 288) Mrs. 
Kingdon has resided in various states, most recently in the State of Georgia, from about 
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March 1999 to the present. (R. 197; Ga. Hearing p. 13) Even though Mrs. Kingdon had 
legal custody of the girls, she permitted them to live with their father for extended periods 
of time. (R. 54; Ga. Hearing p. 20, 41-44). At the time of the Third District Court's 
custody modification order, Julie was living with her mother in Georgia, and Stacie had 
resided with her father in Utah the preceding 11 months. (R.197) More specifically, 
Stacie resided with Mr. Kingdon from July 17, 2002, until June 4, 2002, at which time 
she went back to Georgia for a visit planned to last only until July 1, 2002. (R. 208-209, 
212) 
On July 1, 2002, Mrs. Kingdon refused to put Stacie on her scheduled return flight to 
Utah. (R. 206-207) On July 3, 2002, less than a month after the change of custody had 
been filed in Utah, Mrs. Kingdon petitioned the Superior Court of Mcintosh County, 
Georgia, for temporary and permanent custody of Stacie, based on the claim of an 
emergency situation due to alleged abuse of the child while the child had been in Utah. 
(R. 221-225, 239-243) The pleadings to the Georgia court also made note that Stacie was 
14 years of age, the age at which a child can elect which parent has custody under 
Georgia statute. (R. 223, 241) At no time did Mrs. Kingdon attempt to bring the matter 
back to the Utah court. 
On July 3, 2002, Mr. Kingdon filed a Motion for Writ of Assistance with the Third 
District Court in an attempt to gain the Court's assistance in enforcement of its custody 
order. (R. 215-216). Mr. Kingdon appeared before the Honorable Judge Livingston in 
the District courtroom. (R. 214) Judge Livingston decided not to sign the Writ, but said 
he would consider holding a hearing to investigate the matter more fully. (R. 214) 
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On July 8, 2002, Judge Livingston received notice that a custody proceeding had been 
initiated in the Georgia court. (R. 220) Judge Livingston then contacted Judge Robert L. 
Russell of the Mcintosh County Superior Court, and the judges decided that Georgia 
should assume jurisdiction of the case. (R. 268, 287) The judges agreed Georgia should 
have jurisdiction, even though neither judge questioned the validity of Judge Livingston's 
modification order of June 11th. (Ga. Hearing p. 29-30) Mr. Kingdon was not allowed to 
participate in the communication between the courts, nor was any record kept clearly 
setting forth the basis of the agreement between the judges. (R. 284-285, 291; Ga. 
Hearing p. 46) When Mr. Kingdon later requested that the Third District Court provide 
him with a copy of the record of communication between the courts, Judge Livingston 
indicated that his Minute Entry of July 30, 2002, was the record in question. (R. 291) 
After Mr. Kingdon had also received notice of the custody proceedings initiated in 
Georgia, he filed a Motion to Continue Jurisdiction and Objection to Relinquish 
Jurisdiction on July 19, 2002, in the Third District Court. (R. 250-255). In said motion, 
Mr. Kingdon argued that Utah had proper jurisdiction of the case under UCCJEA and the 
PKPA. (R. 250-255) When Mr. Kingdon contacted Judge Livingston's office on July 
23, 2002, to see if the judge had reviewed the motion, one of the judge's assistants 
informed Mr. Kingdon that Judge Livingston had contacted Judge Russell some days 
prior and that the judges had already decided that Georgia should assume jurisdiction; 
said communication between Judge Livingston and Judge Russell would have occurred a 
few days after July 8, 2002 (R. 220) Judge Livingston's final order transferring 
jurisdiction to Georgia makes no mention of the PKPA. (R. 268) Nor does said order set 
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forth any findings of fact supporting its conclusion that jurisdiction of the case is properly 
vested with the State of Georgia. (R. 268) 
On August 2, 2002, the Honorable Judge Robert L. Russell of the Superior Court of 
Mcintosh County, Georgia, ordered that the State of Georgia assume jurisdiction of the 
case. (R. 281) On August 19, 2002, a hearing was held in the Superior Court to 
determine custody of the minor children, (see Ga. Hearing in the Addendum) Mr. 
Kingdon appeared at the hearing, and entered his objection to the proceedings on the 
grounds that Utah, not Georgia, had proper jurisdiction of the matter. (Ga. Hearing p. 2-
9, 40-41) Judge Russell answered some questions posed by Mr. Kingdon regarding how 
the judges had decided that Georgia should assume jurisdiction. (Ga. Hearing p. 27-30) 
However, Judge Russell admitted that no record had been kept of the communication 
between himself and Judge Livingston. (Ga. Hearing p. 46) Mr. Kingdon was also given 
opportunity to question Mrs. Kingdon regarding facts pertinent to the matter of 
jurisdiction, including where the children had resided and for how long, whether she had 
consented to the custody modification made in Utah, and why she had petitioned the 
Georgia court for modification of the custody order rather than returning to the Utah. 
(Ga. Hearing p. 18-26, 30-31) The hearing resulted in an award of custody of both 
children to Mrs. Kingdon, based on the fact that Judge Livingston had declined to 
exercise jurisdiction, that the Georgia court had assumed jurisdiction, and that the child 
election laws of the State of Georgia allowed the children to choose to live with their 
mother. (Ga. Hearing p. 44-45) Judge Russell made no finding regarding the alleged 
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abuse of Stacie while she lived with her father, the key issue that had fomented the 
change of jurisdiction from Utah to Georgia in the first place. (Ga. Hearing p. 41-45) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Utah has proper jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody 
and Jurisdiction Act and the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act. The child 
custody modification order entered by the Third Judicial District Court on June 11, 2002 
was made in accordance with the aforementioned Acts. Once the Third District Court 
had entered its custody order, it had continuing jurisdiction over the case, and no other 
state had authority to modify its determination while jurisdiction was vested with Utah, 
unless Utah lost jurisdiction or declined to exercise its jurisdiction. The Third District 
Court did not lose jurisdiction, and should not have declined to exercise jurisdiction, 
based on the rules of UCCJEA and PKPA and clear legal precedence. 
In the course of the proceedings, the Third District Court did not give the Mr. 
Kingdon the opportunity to be heard before rendering its decision regarding jurisdiction. 
Once the Utah court had been notified of the Georgia petition to modify the Utah order 
based on an alleged emergency situation, the Utah court should have held a hearing to 
allow both parties to present evidence before any decision was made regarding 
jurisdiction. No such hearing was held. Although the judges of the Utah and Georgia 
trial courts did contact each other, no record was made of the communication between the 
courts as required. 
In reaching its conclusion that jurisdiction of this case was properly vested with 
the State of Georgia, the Third District Court made no findings of fact to support said 
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conclusion. Without appropriate findings, the trial court's decision regarding jurisdiction 
is unjustified, and should be reversed by the appellate court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. UTAH HAS PROPER JURISDICTION UNDER UCCJEA AND PKPA 
A. The Utah trial court had jurisdiction to enter the custody modification 
order of June 11, 2002, 
The State of Kansas entered the initial child custody order for this case in 
September 1989. Shortly thereafter, however, both Mr. Kingdon and Mrs. Kingdon, and 
the minor children, left the State of Kansas and have not resided there again. The Kansas 
court which had entered the original custody order even refused to entertain a dispute 
over the father's visitation rights in the summer of 2001, based on the finding that the 
Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, was the proper venue to hear the 
visitation matter. Since Mr. Kingdon, Mrs. Kingdon, and the children had long since left 
the State of Kansas and no longer had any significant connection to that State, by the time 
the Third District Court in Utah entered its child custody modification order, Kansas no 
longer had jurisdiction over child custody. 
Did, then, the State of Utah have a proper jurisdiction to enter its child custody 
modification order of June 11, 2002? A review of the relevant statutes shows that Utah 
did indeed have authority to enter the order. 
The Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act and the 
federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act are designed to determine which state has 
jurisdiction over custody actions. Under UCCJEA, specifically Utah Code Ann. § 78-
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45c-203, the State of Utah had jurisdiction to modify the Kansas order based on the fact 
that 1) Utah had jurisdiction to make an initial child-custody determination under U.C.A. 
§ 78-45c-201, and 2) the children and parents no longer resided in the State of Kansas. 
The fact that the children and parents no longer resided in Kansas is evident from the 
record. Utah met the provisions of U.C.A. § 78-45c-201 for making an initial child-
custody determination by virtue of the fact that Stacie Kingdon's home state was Utah at 
the time of the modification order, and Julie Kingdon had a significant connection with 
the state of Utah and there was substantial evidence available in Utah concerning her 
care, protection, training, and personal relationships. 
The modification order of June 11, 2002, likewise met the provisions of the 
PKPA, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A. This statute provides: 
(f) A court of a State may modify a determination of the custody of the same 
child made by a court of another State, if— 
(1) it has jurisdiction to make such a child custody determination; and 
(2) the court of the other State no longer has jurisdiction, or it has declined 
to exercise such jurisdiction to modify such determination. 
Utah had jurisdiction under its own state laws to make the child custody 
determination, and Kansas no longer had jurisdiction of the matter, thus satisfying the 
requirements of the PKPA. 
The child custody modification order entered by the Third District Court was done 
with Mrs. Kingdon's consent. It is possible that the split custody arrangement, which the 
parties agreed was in the best interests of the children, could have been effected through 
the Georgia courts, since Julie Kingdon's home state was Georgia at the time of the 
modification. The State of Georgia's laws regarding jurisdiction of a child custody 
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matter are very similar to Utah's. However, Mrs. Kingdon was satisfied to use the Utah 
court for the agreed-upon modification, and she never petitioned the Georgia court to 
exercise jurisdiction until after the Third District Court had already entered its 
modification order. Once she had submitted to the jurisdiction of the Utah court, she was 
bound by the determination of that court, in accordance with U.C.A. § 78-45c-106. 
It is also important to note that both Judge Livingston of Utah and Judge Russell 
of Georgia never questioned the validity of Utah's modification order when they 
conferred about which state should have jurisdiction. During the Georgia custody 
hearing on August 19, 2002, Mr. Kingdon asked Judge Russell if either judge had 
questioned the propriety of the existing Utah order. Judge Russell said that "that wasn't 
challenged." When Mr. Kingdon asked if the judges had believed Utah exercised proper 
jurisdiction to make the modification, Judge Russell replied: "Judge Livingston thought 
so at the time." 
B. The Utah trial court had exclusive, continuing jurisdiction after the custody 
modification. 
Under UCCJEA, once the Utah court entered its child custody modification order, the 
court had exclusive, continuing jurisdiction of the case. U.C.A. § 78-45c-202 provides 
that having made a child-custody determination consistent with § 203, Utah retains 
jurisdiction until all the children and parents lose "significant connection" to the state or 
no longer reside in the state. Mr. Kingdon has remained a resident of the State of Utah 
from the time the child custody modification order was entered to the present; thus Utah 
retained continuing jurisdiction under UCCJEA. 
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Under PKPA, jurisdiction continues with the same court as long as the court has 
jurisdiction under the laws of that state and that state remains the residence of the child or 
of any contestant (28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(d)). Utah had continuing jurisdiction under 
U.C.A. § 78-45c-202, and Mr. Kingdon remained a Utah resident; thus Utah retained 
continuing jurisdiction under PKPA. 
C The Utah trial court erred in declining to exercise jurisdiction. 
While Utah had exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under UCCJEA and PKPA, no 
other state had a right to modify the Utah custody order, unless Utah lost jurisdiction or 
declined to exercise jurisdiction (28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(f)). Utah did not lose its 
jurisdiction (as shown in B above), but did err in declining to exercise jurisdiction. 
U.C.A. § 78-45c-207 and 208 provide reasons why a Utah court may decline to 
exercise jurisdiction over a child-custody determination. Section 208 deals with 
declining jurisdiction by reason of unjustifiable conduct on the part of the person 
invoking the court's jurisdiction, and does not apply in this instance. Section 207 
provides that a Utah court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction if it determines that it is 
an inconvenient forum and another state is a more convenient forum. According to 
subsection (1): "The issue of inconvenient forum may be raised upon the court's own 
motion, request of another court, or motion of a party." Neither Mr. Kingdon nor Mrs. 
Kingdon ever raised the issue of inconvenient forum in the Third Judicial District Court, 
and there is no clear indication on the record that the trial courts of Utah or Georgia 
raised the issue, either. Judge Livingston's final order regarding jurisdiction does not say 
that Utah was determined to be an inconvenient forum; it says rather "that the forum for 
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determining custody of both minor children, Stacie and Julie, is properly vested with the 
State of Georgia." Without knowing what the Utah trial court's basis was for concluding 
that Georgia was the proper forum for a custody determination, it is a matter of 
speculation to say whether or not the Court applied the rules of § 207 to this case. 
It would appear, however, from Judge Russell's findings at the conclusion of the 
August 19, 2002, hearing in the Georgia trial court, that U.C.A. § 78-45c-207 might not 
have been the basis used by the Utah court in declining to exercise jurisdiction. Judge 
Russell stated: 
"Judge Livingston declined to exercise Utah jurisdiction and agreed that Georgia was 
the home state of both children because of significant contacts and the best interest of the 
children and emergency action needed." 
It would seem, rather, that Judge Livingston erred in his interpretation of the "home 
state" definition, which under UCCJEA and PKPA is the state where the child resided for 
the six months preceding a custody determination (U.C.A. § 78-45c-102(7) and 28 
U.S.C.A. § 1738A(b)(4)). Under the definitions of both Acts, when Utah entered its 
custody modification order on June 11th, Julie's home state was Georgia, and Stacie's 
home state was Utah. 
Even if the provisions of U.C.A. § 78-45c-207 had been applied to this case, however, 
it should be evident that Utah would have been the most appropriate forum to entertain 
any proceeding to modify its own custody order of June 11, 2002. The primary factors to 
consider would have been Mrs. Kingdon's allegations of child abuse and the nature and 
location of the evidence regarding the alleged abuse. If the alleged abuse had really taken 
place, evidence thereof would have been found in the State of Utah in the form of school 
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and/or medical records, the testimony of witnesses in Utah who had close contact with 
Stacie and her family, etc. (The Third Judicial District Court and the Mcintosh County 
Superior Court never made any findings of abuse, nor did either court ever even attempt 
to ascertain whether Mrs. Kingdon's allegations of abuse were true.) The other relevant 
factors listed in U.C.A. § 78-45-C-207 for the Utah court to consider would not have had 
as much import as the charges of abuse and the alleged emergency situation rising 
therefrom. 
Without clearly establishing that Utah was an inconvenient forum to make a child-
custody determination, Judge Livingston's order vacating the previous child custody 
modification order and transferring jurisdiction to the State of Georgia violates both the 
UCCJEA and PKPA. These Acts are specifically designed to determine which state has 
jurisdiction over custody actions. They attempt to set jurisdiction where the most 
evidence is located and are designed to prevent parents from taking their children from 
one jurisdiction to another in an attempt to gain advantage over the other parent with 
regards to custody issues. 
Mr. Kingdon contends in his Motion to Continue Jurisdiction and Objection to 
Relinquishment of Jurisdiction that in filing a Petition for Change of Custody in the 
Superior Court of Mcintosh County, Georgia, Mrs. Kingdon was seeking an advantage 
she could obtain in the Georgia court that she could not obtain in the Utah court; namely, 
the child-election laws of the State of Georgia, which allow a child of age fourteen or 
older to choose which parent with whom she desires to live. Georgia Code § 19-9-1 
includes the following provision: 
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In all cases in which the child has reached the age of 14 years, the child shall have the 
right to select the parent with whom he or she desires to live. The child's selection shall 
be controlling, unless the parent so selected is determined not to be a fit and proper 
person to have the custody of the child. 
Although Mrs. Kingdon denied prior knowledge of Georgia's child election laws 
during the August 19th hearing in the Mcintosh County Superior Court, both her Petition 
for Change of Custody and Motion for Ex Parte Relief filed previously in the Georgia 
court made specific mention of Stacie's age as grounds for obtaining the relief Mrs. 
Kingdon sought. As it turned out, Mrs. Kingdon did gain the advantage that she sought— 
Georgia's child election provision was the sole determining factor for awarding custody 
of Julie and Stacie to Mrs. Kingdon in the Georgia trial court. 
Even if Mrs. Kingdon didn't intend to use Georgia's child election laws to her 
advantage, the fact remains that she, the non-custodial parent, knowingly detained Stacie 
from Mr. Kingdon, the custodial parent, and never sought to resolve the matter through 
the Utah court which had entered the custody order, with Mrs. Kingdon's consent, less 
than one month prior to her filing a complaint in the Georgia court. 
In the case of Curtis v. Curtis, 789 P.2d 717 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), after a custody 
order was entered in the State of Utah, the non-custodial father, William Curtis, took the 
children to Mississippi and filed for a change of custody in the Mississippi court. He 
claimed that the need to modify custody resulted from an "emergency situation" 
involving abuse of the children. The Utah trial court transferred jurisdiction to the 
Mississippi trial court, but that judgment was reversed by the Utah Court of Appeals. In 
its published opinion, the Court of Appeals found that: 1) Utah had jurisdiction for the 
16 
initial custody decree, 2) that Utah had continuing jurisdiction to modify the decree and 
had not lost jurisdiction, and 3) that Utah had not declined to exercise its jurisdiction. In 
regards to the issue of declining jurisdiction the Court noted: 
A second state with jurisdiction may modify a first state's custody decree if the first 
state has declined to exercise jurisdiction. See, e.g., E.E.B. v. D.A., 89 N.J. 595, 446 A.2d 
871, 877 (1982). However William never requested Utah courts to exercise their 
modification jurisdiction. Rather, he chose to try his luck in another forum. Therefore, 
not having had the opportunity to exercise its jurisdiction, we hold that the Utah court had 
not declined to exercise it as of the time the Mississippi orders were entered. 
Mrs. Kingdon likewise never requested the Third Judicial District Court to exercise 
its modification jurisdiction, but chose to try her luck in another forum. The Court of 
Appeals should find that since Mrs. Kingdon never returned to the Third District Court, 
said Court should not have declined to exercise jurisdiction. 
II. THE UTAH TRIAL COURT FAILED TO GIVE MR. KINGDON 
OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD BEFORE MAKING ITS DECISION 
REGARDING JURISDICTION 
A. The Utah trial court did not allow Mr. Kingdon to present facts and legal 
arguments before it agreed with the Georgia trial court that Georgia should assume 
jurisdiction. 
The UCCJEA, in U.C.A. § 78-45c-l 10, provides that a Court of the State of Utah 
may communicate with a court of another state as a means of reaching an appropriate 
jurisdictional determination. Subsection (2) states: 
The court may allow the parties to participate in the communication. If the parties 
are not able to participate in the communication, the parties shall be given the opportunity 
to present facts and legal arguments before a decision on jurisdiction is made. 
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When Judge Livingston of the Third Judicial District Court conferred with Judge 
Russell of the Mcintosh County Superior Court as to which State had proper jurisdiction 
of this child custody matter, the judges did not ask Mr. Kingdon, nor apparently Mrs. 
Kingdon or her attorney, to participate in the communication. Although the Third 
District Court was not required to have the parties participate, no effort was made to see 
if an arrangement could be made for all parties to participate. 
The second sentence of § 110(2) does require the Court to give any party which is 
not able to participate in the communication the opportunity to present facts and make 
legal argument prior to the determination of jurisdiction. The commentary in the 
Uniform Child Custody Jur. & Enf. Act (U.L.A.) § 110 provides further elucidation 
regarding this requirement: 
The second sentence of subsection [2] protects the parties against unauthorized ex 
parte communications. The parties' participation in the communication may amount to a 
hearing if there is an opportunity to present facts and jurisdictional arguments. However, 
absent such an opportunity, the participation of the parties should not be considered a 
substitute for a hearing and the parties must be given an opportunity to fairly and fully 
present facts and arguments on the jurisdictional issue before a determination is made. 
This may be done through a hearing or, if appropriate, by affidavit or memorandum. The 
court is expected to set forth the basis for its jurisdictional decision, including any court-
to-court communication which may have been a factor in the decision. 
(The comment above is found in Uniform Laws Annotated, Master Edition, Vol. 
9, Part IA, p. 667, c. 1999, published by West Group.) 
The Third District Court should have held a hearing regarding the jurisdictional 
issue, or at least allowed the parties to submit written statements before the decision 
regarding jurisdiction was made. In Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157 (Utah App. 1992) 
the Court of Appeals found that the District Court of Iron County, Utah, erred in refusing 
18 
to hold a hearing regarding a jurisdictional determination and violated Mrs. Holm's due 
process rights by refusing her attorney's request for a hearing on an undomesticated Ohio 
order. Likewise, without allowing Mr. Kingdon the opportunity to present evidence and 
make argument before it reached its jurisdictional decision, the Third Judicial District 
Court not only erred, but in effect abrogated Mr. Kingdon's due process rights. 
Mr. Kingdon did file a Motion to Continue Jurisdiction and Objection to 
Relinquishment of Jurisdiction, on July 19, 2002, but this was done apparently after 
Judge Livingston and Judge Russell had already conferred and reached their 
jurisdictional decision. The aforesaid Motion was not made in response to a request by 
the Court for facts and legal argument regarding jurisdiction, but was made only after Mr. 
Kingdon had been served with notice of the child custody proceedings initiated in 
Georgia. Mr. Kingdon did not receive notification from the District Court that a 
communication between the Utah and Georgia trial courts had occurred until July 30, 
2002, in the final order regarding jurisdiction. Neither the Utah trial court nor the 
Georgia trial court made any mention of the PKPA in rendering their jurisdictional 
decisions—a statute cited repeatedly by Mr. Kingdon in the aforesaid Motion, because 
neither court had received or reviewed the motion before jurisdictional determination was 
made. 
B, No record was kept of the communication between the Utah and Georgia 
trial courts-
The UCCJEA, in U.C.A. § 78-45c-l 10, provides that a record shall be kept of the 
communication between the courts: 
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(4) Except as provided in Subsection (3), a record shall be made of the 
communication. The parties shall be informed promptly of the communication and 
granted access to the record. 
(5) For the purposes of this section, "record" means information that is inscribed 
on a tangible medium or that which is stored in an electronic or other medium and is 
retrievable in perceivable form. A record includes notes or transcripts of a court reporter 
who listened to a conference call between the courts, an electronic recording of a 
telephone call, a memorandum or an electronic record of the communication between the 
courts, or a memorandum or an electronic record made by a court after the 
communication. 
The Third District Judicial Court failed to keep a record of its communication with the 
Mcintosh County Superior Court, as "record" is defined in the statute cited above. Such 
"record" cannot be the brief entry in Judge Livingston's Minute Entry of July 30, 2002, 
noting that the courts had communicated, lacking any details of said communication. 
Even so, Judge Livingston claims that his reference to telephoning Judge Russell in the 
aforesaid Minute Entry is the "record" in his October 4, 2002 response to Mr. Kingdon's 
Motion to Obtain Record. 
However, such a record must clearly set forth the basis for any agreement between the 
communicating courts. In Footnote 9 of State in Interest of D.S.K., 792 P.2d 118 (Utah 
App. 1990), the Utah Court of Appeals recommended: 
That where judges communicate by telephone, they make prompt written record of 
their conclusions and that the basis for any agreement be set forth clearly in the record. 
Judge Russell of the Georgia trial court verified that no record was kept of the 
communication between himself and Judge Livingston. The exact date of their 
communication cannot even be found in the record on appeal, only approximated from 
the July 8, 2002, fax cover sheet from Mrs. Kingdon's attorney to the District Court, in 
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which the attorney noted that Judge Russell would call Judge Livingston "within a day or 
so." Without keeping the record of communication required under UCCJEA, the Utah 
trial court cannot establish that it did give Mr. Kingdon opportunity to be heard before the 
Court made its jurisdictional determination. 
III. THE UTAH TRIAL COURT FAILED TO SUPPORT ITS CONCLUSION 
REGARDING JURISDICTION WITH ANY FINDINGS OF FACT 
A. The Utah trial court made no findings of fact to warrant a transfer of 
jurisdiction to Georgia. 
Judge Livingston's final order vacating his previous child custody modification 
order and transferring jurisdiction to Georgia is based on the conclusion "that the forum 
for determining custody of both minor children, Stacie and Julie, is properly vested with 
the State of Georgia." However, nowhere in the final order, or anywhere else in the 
record on appeal, does Judge Livingston support this conclusion with any findings of 
fact. Without a valid basis for transferring jurisdiction of this case to the State of 
Georgia, Judge Livingston has committed an abuse of his judicial discretion. 
CONCLUSION STATING THE RELIEF SOUGHT 
The Appellant, Mr. Kingdon, seeks a reversal of the Third Judicial District Court's 
order vacating its prior child custody modification order of June 11, 2002, and a 
reinstatement of that prior custody order. More specifically: 
1) A ruling that the State of Utah has proper jurisdiction of this child custody matter 
under the Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act and the 
federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act. 
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2) A ruling that the trial court failed to give Mr. Kingdon opportunity to be heard 
before it made its determination to transfer jurisdiction to Georgia. 
3) A ruling that the trial court failed to make findings of fact to support its conclusion 
that Georgia was the proper forum for this matter. 
4) To remand the case to the trial court for any further proceedings concerning 
custody of the minor children, and to admonish the trial court to follow the 
procedures outlined in UCCJEA and PKPA in any future child custody 
proceedings. 
DATED this 17th day of December, 2002. 
^eju 
Brian Lee Kingdon, Pro Se 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I personally hand carried and delivered eight true and accurate 
copies of the above Appellant's Brief to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230 and mailed, first-class postage prepaid, two true 
and accurate copies to C. Jean Bolin, Attorney for Mrs. Kingdon, P.O. Box 2332, Darien, 
GA 31305, this 17th day of December, 2002. 
Brian Lee Kingdon, Pro S; 
ADDENDUM 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45c-101, et seq. (Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction 
and Enforcement Act, or UCCJEA) 
28 U.S.CA. § 1738A (Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, or PKPA) 
Certified Transcript of Child Custody Hearing Held August 19, 2002 in the Superior 
Court of Mcintosh County, Georgia 
? l 
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CHAPTER 45b 
PUBLIC SUPPORT OF CHILDREN 
[REPEALED] 
78-45b-l to 78-45b-25. Repealed. 
Repeals . — Laws 1988, ch 1, § 407 repeals 
§§ 78-45b 1 to 78 45b 6, as enacted by Laws 
1975, ch 96, § 1 Laws 1977 ch 145 § 1, and 
Laws 1985, ch 8, § 2 and as amended by Laws 
1987 ch 77, § 3 and Laws 1987, ch 161, 
§§ 309 to 312 relating to common law reme 
dies, definitions, support debt and hearings, 
effective January 19 1988 
Laws 1987, ch 161, § 314 repeals § 78-45b 
6 1, as last amended by Laws 1983, ch 161, 
§ 2 concerning findings in order by depart 
ment and judicial review, effective January 1, 
1988 
Laws 1988 ch 1, § 407 repeals §§ 78 45b 7 
to 78-45b 21, as enacted by Laws 1975, ch 96, 
§§ 7, 10, 12 14 to 18, 20 and 21, Laws 1984 
(S S ), ch 2, § 1 and Laws 1985, ch 9, § 1 and 
as amended by Laws 1977, ch 145, § 8, Laws 
1984, ch 14, ^ 1, Laws 1984 (S S ), ch 2, § 2, 
Laws 1985, ch 10, § 1 and Laws 1987, ch 151 
§ 313, relating to hens, final orders, paymenta 
and charging all uncollectable support debts, 
effective January 19, 1988 
Section 78 45b-22 (L 1975, ch 96, § 22), 
relating to inapplicability of statute of limita-
tions to hens wage assignment or garnish-
ment, was repealed by Laws 1985, ch 10, § 2. 
Laws 1988, ch 1, § 407 repeals W 78-45b-23 
to 78 45b 25 as enacted by Laws 1984, ch. 13, 
§ 5 Laws 1985, ch 13, § 1 and Laws 1987, ch! 
77 § 4 relating to medical and dental ex-
penses of dependent children, providing court 
debt information to consumer reporting agen-
cies and the information received from state 
tax commissioner, effective January 19, 1988, 
For present comparable provisions, see Title 
62A Chapter 11 
CHAPTER 45c 
UTAH UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY 
JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT 
ACT 
Section 
78 45c 1 to 78 45c 26 Repealed 
Part 1 
General Provis ions 
78 45c 101 Title 
78-45c 102 Definitions 
78-45c 103 Proceedings governed by other 
law 
78-45c 104 Application to Indian tribes 
78-45c 105 International application of 
chapter 
78 45c 106 Binding force of child custody 
determination 
78 45c 107 Priority 
78 45c 108 Notice to persons outside state 
78 45c 109 Appearance and limited immu 
nity 
78 45c 110 Communication between courts 
78 45c 111 Taking testimony in another 
state 
Section 
78 45c-112 Cooperation between courts 
Preservation of records 
Part 2 
Jurisdict ion 
78 45c 201 Initial child custody )»***§£ 
tion "* 
78 45c 202 Exclusive, continuing jur 
tion 
78 45c 203 Jurisdiction to modify defc 
nation 
78 45c 204 Temporary emergency ju 
tion . m 
78 45c 205 Notice — Opportunity W J 
heard — Joinder *T 
78 45c 206 Simultaneous p r o c e e d i n g s 
78 45c 207 Inconvenient forum 
78 45c 208 Jurisdiction declined by 
of conduct 
78 45c 209 Information to be submit 
court 
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ping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 USCS diction Act (UCCJA) and Parental Kidnapping 
§ 1738A(c)(2)(A), 6 A.L.R.5th 1. Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 U.S.C.A. 
Significant connection jurisdiction of court to §§ 1738A(c)(2)(A) and 1738A(f)(l), 72 
modify foreign child custody decree under A.L.R.5th 249. 
§§ 3(a)(2) and 14(b) of the Uniform Child Cus- Declining jurisdiction to modify prior child 
tody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and the Paren- custody decree under § 14(a)(1) of Uniform 
tal Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and 
U.S.C.A. §§ 1738A(c)(2)(b) and 1738A(f)(l), 67 Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) 
A.L.R.5th 1. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(f )(2), 73 A.L.R.5th 185. 
Home state jurisdiction of court to modify Appealability of interlocutory or pendente 
foreign child custody decree under §§ 3(a)(1) lite order for temporary child custody, 82 
and 14(a)(2) of Uniform Child Custody Juris- A.L.R.5th 389. 
78-45c-102. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Abandoned" means left without provision for reasonable and nec-
essary care or supervision. 
(2) "Child" means an individual under 18 years of age and not married. 
(3) "Child custody determination" means a judgment, decree, or other 
order of a court providing for the legal custody, physical custody, or 
parent-time with respect to a child. The term includes a permanent, 
temporary, initial, and modification order. The term does not include an 
order relating to child support or other monetary obligation of an individ-
ual. 
(4) "Child custody proceeding" means a proceeding in which legal 
custody, physical custody, or parent-time with respect to a child is an issue. 
The term includes a proceeding for divorce, separation, neglect, abuse, 
dependency, guardianship, paternity, termination of parental rights, and 
protection from domestic violence, in which the issue may appear. The 
term does not include a proceeding involving juvenile delinquency, con-
tractual emancipation, or enforcement under Part 3, Enforcement. 
(5) "Commencement" means the filing of the first pleading in a proceed-
ing. 
(6) "Court" means an entity authorized under the law of a state to 
establish, enforce, or modify a child custody determination. 
(7) "Home state" means the state in which a child lived with a parent or 
a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months immedi-
ately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding. In the case 
of a child less than six months of age, the term means the state in which 
the child lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned. A period of 
temporary absence of any of the mentioned persons is part of the period. 
(8) "Initial determination" means the first child custody determination 
concerning a particular child. 
(9) "Issuing court" means the court that makes a child custody deter-
mination for which enforcement is sought under this chapter. 
(10) "Issuing state" means the state in which a child custody determi-
nation is made. 
(11) "Modification" means a child custody determination that change* 
replaces, supersedes, or is otherwise made after a previous ^ e t e n n ^ a 5 L * 
concerning the same child, whether or not it is made by the court 
made the previous determination. 
(12) "Person" includes government, governmental subdivision, 
or instrumentality, or any other legal or commercial entity. 
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(13) "Person acting as a parent" means a person, other than a parent, 
who: 
(a) has physical custody of the child or has had physical custody for 
a period of six consecutive months, including any temporary absence, 
within one year immediately before the commencement of a child 
custody proceeding; and 
(b) has been awarded legal custody by a court or claims a right to 
legal custody under the law of this state. 
(14) "Physical custody" means the physical care and supervision of a 
child. 
(15) "State" means a state of the United States, the District of Colum-
bia, Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, or any territory or 
insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. 
(16) "Tribe" means an Indian tribe, or band, or Alaskan Native village 
which is recognized by federal law or formally acknowledged by a state. 
(17) "Writ of assistance" means an order issued by a court authorizing 
law enforcement officers to take physical custody of a child. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-102, enacted by ent-time" for "visitation" in Subsections (3) and 
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 2; 2001, ch. 255, § 36. (4) 
Amendment Notes . — The 2001 amend- Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch 247, 
ment, effective April 30, 2001, substituted "par- § 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Custody proceeding. not custody issue under this chapter T B v 
Voluntary termination of adoptive father's M M.J., 908 P2d 345 (Utah Ct. App 1995). 
parental rights in, and obligations to, child was 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AX.R. — What types of proceedings or de- Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 
terminations are governed by the Uniform 78 A.L R 4th 1028 
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) or the 
78-45c-103. Proceedings governed by other law. 
This chapter does not govern: 
(1) an adoption proceeding; or 
(2) a proceeding pertaining to the authorization of emergency medical 
care for a child. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-103, enacted by Effective Dates . — Laws 2000, ch 247, 
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 3. § 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000 
78-45c-104. Application to Indian tribes. 
(1) A child custody proceeding that pertains to an Indian child as defined in 
the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq., is not subject to this 
chapter to the extent that it is governed by the Indian Child Welfare Act. 
(2) A court of this state shall treat a tribe as a state of the United States for 
purposes of Part 1, General Provisions, and Par t 2, Jurisdiction. 
(3) A child custody determination made by a tribe under factual circum-
stances in substantial conformity with the jurisdictional standards of this 
843 
78-45c-105 JUDICIAL CODE 
chapter shall be recognized and enforced under the provisions of Part 3, 
Enforcement. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-104, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch 247, 
L. 2000 t ch. 247, § 4. § 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Construction and application of U S C A §§ 1901 et seq ) upon child custody 
Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 determinations, 89 A L R 5th 195 
78-45c-105. International application of chapter, 
(1) A court of this state shall treat a foreign country as a state of the United 
States for purposes of applying Part 1, General Provisions, and Part 2, 
Jurisdiction. 
(2) A child custody determination made in a foreign country under factual 
circumstances in substantial conformity with the jurisdictional standards of 
this chapter shall be recognized and enforced under Par t 3, Enforcement. 
(3) The court need not apply the provisions of this chapter when the child 
custody law of the other country violates fundamental principles of human 
rights. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-105, enacted by Effective Dates . — Laws 2000, ch 247, 
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 5. § 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000 
78-45c-106. Binding force of child custody determination. 
A child custody determination made by a court of this state that had 
jurisdiction under this chapter binds all persons who have been served in 
accordance with the laws of this state or notified in accordance with Section 
78-45c-108 or who have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, and who 
have been given an opportunity to be heard. The determination is conclusive as 
to them as to all decided issues of law and fact except to the extent the 
determination is modified. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-106, enacted by Effective Dates . — Laws 2000, ch 247, 
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 6. § 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000 
78-45c-107. Priority. 
If a question of existence or exercise of jurisdiction under this chapter is 
raised in a child custody proceeding, the question, upon request of a party, 
shall be given priority on the calendar and handled expeditiously 
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-107, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch 247, 
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 7. § 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000. 
78-45c-108. Notice to persons outside state. 
(1) Notice required for the exercise of jurisdiction when a person is outs*f* 
this state may be given m a manner prescribed by the law of this state ™* ^  
service of process or by the law of the state in which the service is made. No 
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shall be given in a manner reasonably calculated to give actual notice, but may 
be by publication if other means are not effective. 
(2) Proof of service may be made in the manner prescribed by the law of this 
state or by the law of the state in which the service is made. 
(3) Notice is not required for the exercise of jurisdiction with respect to a 
person who submits to the jurisdiction of the court. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-108, enacted by § 42 makes the act effective on Jul\ 1, 2000 
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 8. Cross-References. — Service of process. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch 247, Rule 4 , U R C P 
78-45c-109. Appearance and limited immunity, 
(1) A party to a child custody proceeding who is not subject to personal 
jurisdiction in this state and is a responding party under Part 2, Jurisdiction, 
a party in a proceeding to modify a child custody determination under Part 2, 
Jurisdiction, or a petitioner in a proceeding to enforce or register a child 
custody determination under Part 3, Enforcement, may appear and participate 
in the proceeding without submitting to personal jurisdiction over the party for 
another proceeding or purpose. 
(2) A party is not subject to personal jurisdiction in this state solely by being 
physically present for the purpose of participating in a proceeding under this 
chapter. If a party is subject to personal jurisdiction in this state on a basis 
other than physical presence, the party may be served with process in this 
state. If a party present in this state is subject to the jurisdiction of another 
state, service of process allowable under the laws of that state may be 
accomplished in this state. 
(3) The immunity granted by this section does not extend to civil litigation 
based on acts unrelated to the participation in a proceeding under this chapter 
committed by an individual while present in this state. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-109, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch 247, 
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 9. § 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000 
78-45c-110. Communication between courts. 
(1) A court of this state may communicate with a court in another state 
concerning a proceeding arising under this chapter. 
(2) The court may allow the parties to participate in the communication. If 
the parties are not able to participate in the communication, the parties shall 
be given the opportunity to present facts and legal arguments before a decision 
on jurisdiction is made. 
(3) A communication between courts on schedules, calendars, court records, 
and similar matters may occur without informing the parties. A record need 
not be made of that communication. 
(4) Except as provided in Subsection (3), a record shall be made of the 
communication. The parties shall be informed promptly of the communication 
and granted access to the record. 
(5) For the purposes of this section, "record" means information that is 
inscribed on a tangible medium or that which is stored in an electronic or other 
medium and is retrievable in perceivable form. A record includes notes or 
transcripts of a court reporter who listened to a conference call between the 
courts, an electronic recording of a telephone call, a memorandum or an 
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electronic record of the communication between the courts, or a memorandum 
or an electronic record made by a court after the communication. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-110, enacted by Effective Dates . — Laws 2000, ch 247, 
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 10. § 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000 
78-45c-lll. Taking testimony in another state. 
(1) In addition to other procedures available to a party, a party to a child 
custody proceeding may offer testimony of witnesses who are located in 
another state, including testimony of the parties and the child, by deposition or 
other means allowable in this state for testimony taken in another state. The 
court on its own motion may order that the testimony of a person be taken in 
another state and may prescribe the manner in which and the terms upon 
which the testimony is taken. 
(2) A court of this state may permit an individual residing in another state 
to be deposed or to testify by telephone, audiovisual means, or other electronic 
means before a designated court or at another location in that state. A court of 
this state shall cooperate with courts of other states in designating an 
appropriate location for the deposition or testimony. 
(3) Documentary evidence transmitted from another state to a court of this 
state by technological means that do not produce an original writing may not 
be excluded from evidence on an objection based on the means of transmission. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45c- l l l , enacted by Effective Dates . — Laws 2000, ch 247, 
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 11. § 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000 
78-45c-112, Cooperation between courts — Preservation 
of records. 
( D A court of this state may request the appropriate court of another state 
to: 
(a) hold an evidentiary hearing; 
(b) order a person to produce or give evidence under procedures of that 
state; 
(c) order that an evaluation be made with respect to the custody of a 
child involved in a pending proceeding; 
(d) forward to the court of this state a certified copy of the transcript of 
the record of the hearing, the evidence otherwise presented, and any 
evaluation prepared in compliance with the request; and 
(e) order a party to a child custody proceeding or any person having 
physical custody of the child to appear in the proceeding with or without 
the child. 
(2) Upon request of a court of another state, a court of this state may: 
(a) hold a hearing or enter an order described in Subsection (1); <>r 
(b) order a person in this state to appear alone or with the child in a 
custody proceeding in another state. 
(3) A court of this state may condition compliance with a request unae 
Subsection (2Kb) upon assurance by the other state that travel and other 
necessary expenses will be advanced or reimbursed. If the person who n 
physical custody of the child cannot be served or fails to obey the order, or 
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appears the order will be ineffective, the court may issue a warrant of arrest 
against the person to secure his appearance with the child in the other state. 
(4) Travel and other necessary and reasonable expenses incurred under 
Subsections (1) and (2) may be assessed against the parties according to the 
law of this state. 
(5) A court of this state shall preserve the pleadings, orders, decrees, records 
of hearings, evaluations, and other pertinent records with respect to a child 
custody proceeding until the child attains 18 years of age. Upon appropriate 
request by a court or law enforcement official of another state, the court shall 
forward a certified copy of these records. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-U2, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch 247, 
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 12. *? 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000. 
PART 2 
JURISDICTION 
78-45c-201. Initial child custody jurisdiction. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 78-45c-204, a court of this state 
has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination only if: 
(a) this state is the home state of the child on the date of the 
commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child 
within six months before the commencement of the proceeding and the 
child is absent from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent 
continues to live in this state; 
(b) a court of another state does not have jurisdiction under Subsection 
(l)(a), or a court of the home state of the child has declined to exercise 
jurisdiction on the ground that this state is the more appropriate forum 
under Section 78-45c-207 or 78-45c-208; and 
(i) the child and the child's parents, or the child and at least one 
parent or a person acting as a parent have a significant connection 
with this state other than mere physical presence; and 
(ii) substantial evidence is available in this state concerning the 
child's care, protection, training, and personal relationships; 
(c) all courts having jurisdiction under Subsection (l)(a) or (b) have 
declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that a court of this state is 
the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child under 
Section 78-45c-207 or 78-45c-208; or 
(d) no state would have jurisdiction under Subsection (l)(a), (b), or (c). 
(2) Subsection (1) is the exclusive jurisdictional basis for making a child 
custody determination by a court of this state. 
(3) Physical presence of, or personal jurisdiction over, a party or a child is 
neither necessary nor sufficient to make a child custody determination. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-201, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247, 
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 13. § 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
AN AL\ sis 
Appropriate forum. 
Concurrent jurisdiction. 
Preferred forum. 
Appropriate forum. 
Utah district court appropriately retained 
jurisdiction under the Utah Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Act to make any determi-
nations regarding custody, visitation or other 
matters relevant to the children, where the 
parents were divorced in Utah and, although 
the mother had taken the children to Washing-
ton, that state specifically declined to exercise 
jurisdiction because of Utah's past and present 
involvement with the matter Rawlings v 
Weiner, 752 P.2d 1327 (Utah Ct. App ), cert, 
denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). 
This chapter does not give a preference to the 
"home state." The significant connection or sub-
stantial connection basis comes into play either 
when the home state test cannot be met or as 
an alternative to that test. In re W.D. v. Drake, 
770 P.2d 1011 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 789 
P.2d 33 (Utah 1989). 
Even though a certain state may be the 
"home state," if the child and his family have 
equal or stronger ties with another state that 
other state also has jurisdiction. In re WD. v 
Drake, 770 P.2d 1011 (Utah Ct. App), cert 
denied, 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1989). 
Judge did not abuse his discretion in deciding 
that California was the more appropriate and 
convenient forum to litigate custody and in 
granting the state's motion to dismiss the nat-
ural parents ' petition, where substantial infor-
mation concerning the parents ' abilities and 
past history was in California, the mother had 
only recently come to Utah but had lived for 
years in California, and the parents' purpose in 
coming to Utah was to shop for jurisdiction. In 
re W.D. v. Drake, 770 P.2d 1011 (Utah Ct. App.), 
cert, denied, 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1989) 
The state that made the original custody 
determination has exclusive continuing juris-
diction over the custody issue until that state 
loses or declines to exercise its jurisdiction. 
Crump v. Crump, 821 P.2d 1172 (Utah Ct. App. 
1991), cert, granted, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992) 
Concurrent jurisdict ion. 
Utah had concurrent jurisdiction to modify a 
child custody order from another state when it 
was in the best interest of the child for Utah to 
assume jurisdiction because the child and at 
least one parent had a significant connection 
with Utah and there was substantive evidence 
in Utah pertaining to the child's care, protec-
tion, training, and personal relationships. 
Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992). 
Preferred forum. 
In child custody matters, continuing jurisdic-
tion of court in which divorce decree originated 
is intended to remain exclusive, even if other 
states have come to satisfy one or more of the 
criteria of this section, unless the decree state 
decides not to exercise it. Liska v. Liska, 902 
P.2d 644 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AX.R. — Significant connection jurisdiction 
of court under § 3(a)(2) of the Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and the Pa-
rental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 
USCS § 1738A(c)(2)(B), 5 A.L.R.5th 550. 
Abandonment and emergency jurisdiction of 
court under § 3(a)(3) of the Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and the Pa-
rental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 
USCS § 1738(c)(2)(C), 5 A.L.R 5th 788 
Home state jurisdiction of court under 
§ 3(a)(1) of the Uniform Child Custody Juris-
diction Act (UCCJA) or the Parental Kidnap-
ping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 USCS § 1738A 
(c)(2)(A), 6 A.L.R.5th 1 
Default jurisdiction of court under § (a)(4) of 
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act 
(UCCJA) or the Parental Kidnapping P ^ f n " 
tion Act (PKPA), 28 USCS § 1738A(c)(2)(D), 6 
A.L.R.5th 69. 
78-45c-202. Exclusive, continuing jurisdiction, 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 78-45c-204, a court of this^t*> 
that has made a child custody determination consistent with Section 7o 
201 or 78-45c-203 has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the determina-
tion until: h'\Aan& 
(a) a court of this state determines that neither the child, the c . - ^ j 
one parent, nor the child and a person acting as a parent have a sigm 
848 
CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT 78-45C-ZU4 
connection with this state and that substantial evidence is no longer 
available in this state concerning the child's care, protection, training, and 
personal relationships; or 
(b) a court of this state or a court of another state determines that 
neither the child, nor a parent, nor any person acting as a parent presently 
resides in this state. 
(2) A court of this state that has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under this 
section may decline to exercise its jurisdiction if the court determines that it is 
an inconvenient forum under Section 78-45c-207. 
(3) A court of this state that has made a child custody determination and 
does not have exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under this section may modify 
that determination only if it has jurisdiction to make an initial determination 
under Section 78-45c-201. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-202, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch 247, 
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 14. § 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000 
78-45c-203. Jurisdiction to modify determination. 
Except as otherwise provided in Section 78-45c-204, a court of this state may 
not modify a child custody determination made by a court of another state 
unless a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial determination 
under Subsection 78-45c-201(l)(a) or (b) and: 
(1) the court of the other state determines it no longer has exclusive, 
continuing jurisdiction under Section 78-45c-202 or that a court of this 
state would be a more convenient forum under Section 78-45c-207; or 
(2) a court of this state or a court of the other state determines that 
neither the child, nor a parent, nor any person acting as a parent presently 
resides in the other state. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-203, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch 247, 
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 15. § 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000 
78-45c-204. Temporary emergency jurisdiction. 
(1) A court of this state has temporary emergency jurisdiction if the child is 
present in this state and the child has been abandoned or it is necessary in an 
emergency to protect the child because the child, or a sibling or parent of the 
child, is subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse. 
(2) If there is no previous child custody determination that is entitled to be 
enforced under this chapter, and if no child custody proceeding has been 
commenced in a court of a state having jurisdiction under Sections 78-45c-201 
through 78-45c-203, a child custody determination made under this section 
remains in effect until an order is obtained from a court of a state having 
jurisdiction under Sections 78-45c-201 through 78-45c-203. If a child custody 
proceeding has not been or is not commenced in a court of a state having 
jurisdiction under Sections 78-45c-201 through 78-45c-203, a child custody 
determination made under this section becomes a final determination, if: 
(a) it so provides; and 
(b) this state becomes the home state of the child. 
(3) If there is a previous child custody determination that is entitled to be 
enforced under this chapter, or a child custody proceeding has been commenced 
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in a court of a state having jurisdiction under Sections 78-45c-201 through 
78-45c-203, any order issued by a court of this state under this section shall 
specify in the order a period of time which the court considers adequate to 
allow the person seeking an order to obtain an order from the state having 
jurisdiction under Sections 78-45c-201 through 78-45c-203. The order issued in 
this state remains in effect until an order is obtained from the other state 
within the period specified or the period expires. 
(4) A court of this state tha t has been asked to make a child custody 
determination under this section, upon being informed that a child custody 
proceeding has been commenced, or a child custody determination has been 
made, by a court of a state having jurisdiction under Sections 78-45c-201 
through 78-45c-203, shall immediately communicate with the other court. A 
court of this state that is exercising jurisdiction pursuant to Sections 78-45c-
201 through 78-45c-203, upon being informed that a child custody proceeding 
has been commenced, or a child custody determination has been made by a 
court of another state under a s tatute similar to this section shall immediately 
communicate with the court of that state. The purpose of the communication is 
to resolve the emergency, protect the safety of the parties and the child, and 
determine a period for the duration of the temporary order. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-204, enacted by Effective Dates . — Laws 2000, ch. 247, 
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 16. § 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 118 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (decided under former 
_ § 78-45c-3). 
Emergency jurisdiction. 
- P e r m a n e n t custody. - P e r m a n e n t custody. 
Emergency jurisdict ion. An assumption of emergency jurisdiction is 
Emergency jurisdiction under Subsection an assumption of temporary jurisdiction only; it 
(l)(c) is reserved for extraordinary circum- does not confer upon the state the authority to 
stances. Emergency jurisdiction should be lim- make a permanent custody disposition. In re 
ited to those cases of neglect where the harm is D.S.K., 792 P.2d 118 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
immediate or imminent. In re D.S.K., 792 P.2d (decided under former § 78-45c-3). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Emergency jurisdiction of court 1738A(c)(2)(C)(ii) and 1738A(f), to protect fo-
under §§ 3(aK3)(u) and 14(a) of Uniform Child terests of child notwithstanding existence of 
Custody Jurisdiction Act and Parental Kidnap- prior, valid custody decree rendered by another 
ping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ state, 80 A L.R.5th 117. 
78-45c-205. Notice — Opportunity to be heard — Joinder. 
(1) Before a child custody determination is made under this chapter, notice 
and an opportunity to be heard in accordance with the standards of ^ e5;|° 
78-45c-108 shall be given to all persons entitled to notice under the law oftftw 
state as in child custody proceedings between residents of this state, / 
parent whose parental rights have not been previously terminated, an 
person having physical custody of the child. . J -
(2) This chapter does not govern the enforceability of a child c 
determination made without notice and an opportunity to be heard. 
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(3) The obligation to join a party and the right to intervene as a party in a 
child custody proceeding under this chapter are governed by the law of this 
state as in child custody proceedings between residents of this state. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-205, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247, 
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 17. § 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000. 
7g_45c-206. Simultaneous proceedings, 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 78-45c-204, a court of this state 
may not exercise its jurisdiction under this chapter if at the time of the 
commencement of the proceeding a proceeding concerning the custody of the 
child had been previously commenced in a court of another state having 
jurisdiction substantially in conformity with this chapter, unless the proceed-
ing has been terminated or is stayed by the court of the other state because a 
court of this state is a more convenient forum under Section 78-45c-207. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided in Section 78-45c-204, a court of this state, 
before hearing a child custody proceeding, shall examine the court documents 
and other information supplied by the parties pursuant to Section 78-45c-209. 
If the court determines that a child custody proceeding was previously 
commenced in a court in another state having jurisdiction substantially in 
accordance with this chapter, the court of this state shall stay its proceeding 
and communicate with the court of the other state. If the court of the state 
having jurisdiction substantially in accordance with this chapter does not 
determine that the court of this state is a more appropriate forum, the court of 
this state shall dismiss the proceeding. 
(3) In a proceeding to modify a child custody determination, a court of this 
state shall determine whether a proceeding to enforce the determination has 
been commenced in another state. If a proceeding to enforce a child custody 
determination has been commenced in another state, the court may: 
(a) stay the proceeding for modification pending the entry of an order of 
a court of the other state enforcing, staying, denying, or dismissing the 
proceeding for enforcement; 
(b) enjoin the parties from continuing with the proceeding for enforce-
ment; or 
(c) proceed with the modification under conditions it considers appro-
priate. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-206, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247, 
L. 2000, ch, 247, § 18. § 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Exercise of jurisdiction. 
Exercise of jurisdiction. —Hearing. 
— Hearing. When a mother and child living in Utah 
Pending foreign proceeding. sought relief in Utah from an Ohio custody 
—Stay of Utah action. order being enforced in Utah by her husband, 
Proceedings elsewhere. the district court erred in refusing to hold a 
— Due process. hearing to examine whether, under §§ 78-45c-
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14 and 78-45c-6, jurisdiction should be exer-
cised by the Utah court Given the policy con-
siderations behind this chapter, the district 
court, at the very least, should have stayed its 
determination until after it held a hearing to 
determine whether jurisdiction should have 
been exercised. Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Pending foreign proceeding. 
—Stay of Utah action. 
Utah district court, after learning of prior 
guardianship proceedings in Oregon, was re-
quired to stay a Utah action seeking to deter-
mine child custody and to communicate with 
the Oregon court to determine the propriety of 
further proceedings in Oregon, so that the 
issues could be litigated in the more appropri-
ate forum, where the child resided in Oregon at 
the time and the Oregon court had appointed 
the child's grandparents as guardians. Cop-
pedge v Harding, 714 P2d 1121 (Utah 1985) 
Proceedings e l sewhere . 
Where grandparents in Oregon, with whom 
child was visiting, had won custody in Oregon 
court, Utah district court was required to stay 
parents' proceeding seeking custody determina-
tion and to communicate with Oregon court to 
determine the propriety of further proceedings 
in Oregon. Coppedge v. Harding, 714 P.2d 1121 
(Utah 1985). 
—Due process . 
A mother was denied her due process rights 
by the trial court's enforcement of a foreign-
custody modification judgment which had ques-
tionable jurisdictional validity without giving 
the mother reasonable notice and opportunity 
to be heard. Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — What types of proceedings or de-
terminations are governed by the Uniform 
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) or the 
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 
78 A.L.R.4th 1028. 
Default jurisdiction of court under § (a)(4) of 
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act 
(UCCJA) or the Parental Kidnapping Preven-
tion Act (PKPA), 28 USCS § 1738A (c)(2)(D), 6 
A.L.R5th69. 
Pending proceeding in another state as 
ground for declining jurisdiction under § 6(a) of 
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act 
(UCCJA) or the Parental Kidnapping Preven-
tion Act (PKPA), 28 USCS § 1738A(g), 20 
A.L.R.5th 700. 
Significant connection jurisdiction of court to 
modify foreign child custody decree under 
§§ 3(a)(2) and 14(b) of the Uniform Child Cus-
tody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and the Paren-
tal Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 
U.S.C.A. §§ 1738A(c)(2)(b) and 1738A(f)(l), 67 
A.L.R.5th 1. 
Home state jurisdiction of court to modify 
foreign child custody decree under §§ 3(a)(1) 
and 14(a)(2) of Uniform Child Custody Juris-
diction Act (UCCJA) and Parental Kidnapping 
Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 
1738A(c)(2)(A) and 1738A(f)(l), 72 A.L.R.5th 
249. 
Declining jurisdiction to modify prior child 
custody decree under § 14(a)(1) of Uniform 
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) and 
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 
28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(f )(2), 73 A.L.R.5th 185. 
78-45c-207, Inconvenient forum, 
(1) A court of this state that has jurisdiction under this chapter to make a 
child custody determination may decline to exercise its jurisdiction at any time 
if it determines that it is an inconvenient forum under the circumstances and 
that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum. The issue ot 
inconvenient forum may be raised upon the court's own motion, request oi 
another court, or motion of a party. . 
(2) Before determining whether it is an inconvenient forum, a court of tnis 
state shall consider whether it is appropriate tha t a court of another sta 
exercise jurisdiction. For this purpose, the court shall allow the parties to 
submit information and shall consider all relevant factors, including: 
(a) whether domestic violence has occurred and is likely to continu 
the future and which state could best protect the parties and the cruiOi 
(b) the length of time the child has resided outside this state; 
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(c) the distance between the court in this state and the court in the state 
that would assume jurisdiction; 
(d) the relative financial circumstances of the parties; 
(e) any agreement of the parties as to which state should assume 
jurisdiction; 
(f) the nature and location of the evidence required to resolve the 
pending litigation, including the testimony of the child; 
(g) the ability of the court of each state to decide the issue expeditiously 
and the procedures necessary to present the evidence; and 
(h) the familiarity of the court of each state with the facts and issues of 
the pending litigation. 
(3) If a court of this state determines that it is an inconvenient forum and 
that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum, it shall stay the 
proceedings upon condition that a child custody proceeding be promptly 
commenced in another designated state and may impose any other condition 
the court considers just and proper. 
(4) A court of this state may decline to exercise its jurisdiction under this 
chapter if a child custody determination is incidental to an action for divorce or 
another proceeding while still retaining jurisdiction over the divorce or other 
proceeding. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-207, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch. 247, 
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 19. § 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000. 
78-45c-208. Jurisdiction declined by reason of conduct. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in Section 78-45c-204 or by other law of 
this state, if a court of this state has jurisdiction under this chapter because a 
person invoking the jurisdiction has engaged in unjustifiable conduct, the 
court shall decline to exercise its jurisdiction unless: 
(a) the parents and all persons acting as parents have acquiesced in the 
exercise of jurisdiction; 
(b) a court of the state otherwise having jurisdiction under Sections 
78-45c-201 through 78-45c-203 determines that this state is a more 
appropriate forum under Section 78-45c-207; or 
(c) no other state would have jurisdiction under Sections 78-45c-201 
through 78-45c-203. 
(2) If a court of this state declines to exercise its jurisdiction pursuant to 
Subsection (1), it may fashion an appropriate remedy to ensure the safety of 
the child and prevent a repetition of the wrongful conduct, including staying 
the proceeding until a child custody proceeding is commenced in a court having 
jurisdiction under Sections 78-45c-201 through 78-45c-203. 
(3) If a court dismisses a petition or stays a proceeding because it declines 
to exercise its jurisdiction pursuant to Subsection (1), it shall charge the party 
invoking the jurisdiction of the court with necessary and reasonable expenses 
including costs, communication expenses, attorney's fees, investigative fees, 
expenses for witnesses, travel expenses, and child care during the course of the 
proceedings, unless the party from whom fees are sought establishes that the 
award would be clearly inappropriate. The court may not assess fees, costs, or 
expenses against this state except as otherwise provided by law other than this 
chapter. 
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History: C. 1953, 78-45c-208, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch 247, 
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 20. § 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000 
78-45c-209. Information to be submitted to court. 
(1) In a child custody proceeding, each party, in its first pleading or in an 
attached affidavit, shall give information, if reasonably ascertainable, under 
oath as to the child's present address, the places where the child has lived 
during the last five years, and the names and present addresses of the persons 
with whom the child has lived during that period. The pleading or affidavit 
shall state whether the party: 
(a) has participated, as a party or witness or in any other capacity, in 
any other proceeding concerning the custody of or parent-time with the 
child and, if so, identify the court, the case number of the proceeding, and 
the date of the child custody determination, if any; 
(b) knows of any proceeding that could affect the current proceeding, 
including proceedings for enforcement and proceedings relating to domes-
tic violence, protective orders, termination of parental rights, and adop-
tions and, if so, identify the court and the case number and the nature of 
the proceeding; and 
(c) knows the names and addresses of any person not a party to the 
proceeding who has physical custody of the child or claims rights of legal 
custody or physical custody of, or parent-time with, the child and, if so, the 
names and addresses of those persons. 
(2) If the information required by Subsection (1) is not furnished, the court, 
upon its own motion or that of a party, may stay the proceeding until the 
information is furnished. 
(3) If the declaration as to any of the items described in Subsection (1) is in 
the affirmative, the declarant shall give additional information under oath as 
required by the court. The court may examine the parties under oath as to 
details of the information furnished and other matters pertinent to the court's 
jurisdiction and the disposition of the case. 
(4) Each party has a continuing duty to inform the court of any proceeding 
in this or any other state that could affect the current proceeding. 
(5) If a party alleges in an affidavit or a pleading under oath that the health, 
safety, or liberty of a party or child would be put a t risk by the disclosure of 
identifying information, that information shall be sealed and not disclosed to 
the other party or the public unless the court orders the disclosure to be made 
after a hearing in which the court takes into consideration the health, safety, 
or liberty of the party or child and determines that the disclosure is in the 
interest of justice. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-209, enacted by ent-time" for "visitation" in Subsections (l)(a) 
L. 2000, ch. 247, *> 21; 2001, ch. 255, § 37. and (c) 
Amendment Notes. — The 2001 amend Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch 247, 
ment, effective April 30, 2001, substituted "par- § 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000 
78-45c-210. Appearance of parties and child. 
(1) A court of this state may order a party to a child custody proceeding w o 
is in this state to appear before the court personally with or without the cm -
The court may order any person who is in this state and who has physi 
custody or control of the child to appear physically with the child. 
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(2) If a party to a child custody proceeding whose presence is desired by the 
court is outside this state, the court may order that a notice given pursuant to 
Section 78-45c-108 include a statement directing the party to appear person-
ally with or without the child and declaring that failure to appear may result 
in a decision adverse to the party. 
(3) The court may enter any orders necessary to ensure the safety of the 
child and of any person ordered to appear under this section 
(4) If a party to a child custody proceeding who is outside this state is 
directed to appear under Subsection (2) or desires to appear personally before 
the court with or without the child, the court may require another party to pay 
reasonable and necessary travel and other expenses of the party so appearing 
and of the child. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-210, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch 247, 
L. 2000, ch. 247, <? 22. § 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000 
PART 3 
ENFORCEMENT 
78-45c-301. Definitions. 
As used in this part: 
(1) "Petitioner" means a person who seeks enforcement of a child 
custody determination or enforcement of an order for the return of the 
child under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International 
Child Abduction. 
(2) "Respondent" means a person against whom a proceeding has been 
commenced for enforcement of a child custody determination or enforce-
ment of an order for the return of the child under the Hague Convention 
on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-301, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch 247, 
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 23. § 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000. 
78-45c-302. Scope — Hague Convention Enforcement. 
This chapter may be invoked to enforce: 
(1) a child custody determination; and 
(2) an order for the return of the child made under the Hague Conven-
tion on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. 
History: C. 1953, 78-45c-302, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 2000, ch 247, 
L. 2000, ch. 247, § 24. § 42 makes the act effective on July 1, 2000 
78-45c-303. Duty to enforce. 
(1) A court of this state shall recognize and enforce a child custody 
determination of a court of another state if the latter court exercised jurisdic-
tion that was in substantial conformity with this chapter or the determination 
was made under factual circumstances meeting the jurisdictional standards of 
this chapter and the determination has not been modified in accordance with 
this chapter. 
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ffatcntional infliction of emotional 
that arose out of claims against 
^Industrial Insuiance Commission 
_ v State Indus Ins S>stem 
".1987 672 F Supp 459 affirmed 
I FJd 388 
New Jeiscv Division ol Work 
B'S Compensation had jurisdiction of 
i which aiose from accidents occur 
' in Pennsylvania and no compensa 
I cause of action existed in Pennsylva 
j for permanent disability and theie 
e, no award of such nature could have 
tbeen made bv Pennsvlvania Board claim 
t's right to compensation foi such kind 
[permanent disabilitv was not justicia 
i in the pnoi Pennsvlvania workmen s 
[(Compensation pioceedmg and therefoie 
avvaid of compensation in such proceed 
ing was not res judicata as to such ele 
ment of recovery in subsequent New Jer 
se\ workmen s compensation proceeding 
Bowers v American Bridge Co 1956 
127 A 2d 580 43 N J Super 48 affirmed 
132 A 2d 28 24 N J 390 
Where decedent was employed as sales 
man out of branch office of employer in 
South Dakota and contract between em 
plover and employee was entered into in 
that state and defendant was killed while 
allegedly in course of his employment in 
Iowa state in which death occurred was 
not required to give full faith and credit 
to Workmen s Compensation Act of South 
Dakota and Industrial Commissioner of 
Iowa properly assumed jurisdiction even 
though action was pending before Indus 
trial Commissioner of South Dakota on 
same cause of action Schmidt v Pitts 
burgh Plate Glass Co 1952 55 N W 2d 
227 243 Iowa 1307 
325 Miscellaneous claims 
State court judgment rejecting judg 
ment debtor s request for relief from 
creditor s attempted execution was res 
judicata barring subsequent suit in feder 
al court challenging validity of execution 
same essential factual allegations were 
made in both cases Jones v Pomdexter, 
C A 4 (Va) 1990 903 F 2d 1006 
§ 1738 A. Full faith and credit given to child custody determina-
tions 
(a) The apptopuate authorities of every State shall enforce accord-
ing to its tet ms and shall not modify except as provided in subsec-
tion (f) of this section an) child custody determination made consis-
tently with the provisions of this section by a court of another State 
(b) As used in this section, the term— 
(1) 'child means a person under the age of eighteen, 
(2) ' contestant' means a person, including a parent, who 
claims a right to custody or visitation of a child, 
(3) custody determination" means a judgment, decree, or 
other order of a court providing for the custody or visitation of a 
child, and includes permanent and temporary orders, and initial 
orders and modifications, 
(4) 'home State" means the State in which, immediately 
preceding the time involved, the child lived with his parents, a 
parent or a person acting as parent, for at least six consecutive 
T28USCA SS1651 1860 8TH Vol n 3 6 1 
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months, and in the case of a child less than six months old, the 
State in which the child lived from birth with any of such 
persons. Periods of temporary absence of any of such persons 
are counted as part of the six-month or other period; 
(5) "modification" and "modify" refer to a custody determina-
tion which modifies, replaces, supersedes, or otherwise is made 
subsequent to, a prior custody determination concerning the 
same child, whether made by the same court or not; 
(6) "person acting as a parent" means a person, other than a 
parent, who has physical custody of a child and who has either 
been awarded custody by a court or claims a right to custody; 
(7) "physical custody" means actual possession and control of 
a child; and 
(8) "State" means a State of the United States, the District of 
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or a territory or 
possession of the United States. 
(c) A child custody determination made by a court of a State is 
consistent with the provisions of this section only if— 
(1) such court has jurisdiction under the law of such State; 
and 
(2) one of the following conditions is met: 
(A) such State (i) is the home State of the child on the 
date of the commencement of the proceeding, or (ii) had 
been the child's home State within six months before the 
date of the commencement of the proceeding and the child 
is absent from such State because of his removal or reten-j 
tion by a contestant or for other reasons, and a contestant^ 
continues to live in such State; 
(B) (i) it appears that no other State would have jurisdiC 
tion under subparagraph (A), and (ii) it is in the best inter 
of the child that a court of such State assume jurisdictiC 
because (I) the child and his parents, or the child and 
least one contestant, have a significant connection with sir 
State other than mere physical presence in such State, 
(II) there is available in such State substantial evidefl 
concerning the child's present or future care, protec 
training, and personal relationships; 
(C) the child is physically present in such State and W^ 
child has been abandoned, or (ii) it is necessary 
emergency to protect the child because he has been s 
ed to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse; 
(D) (i) it appears that no other State would have jv 
tion under subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (E), ° 
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State has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that 
the State whose jurisdiction is in issue is the more appropri-
ate forum to determine the custod\ of the child, and (n) it is 
in the best interest of the child that such court assume 
jurisdiction, or 
(E) the court has continuing jurisdiction pursuant to sub 
section (d) of this section 
Hd) The jurisdiction of a court of a State which has made a child 
"stody determination consistently with the provisions of this section 
Mitinues as long as the requirement of subsection (c)(1) of this 
rtion continues to be met and such State remains the residence of 
he child or of any contestant 
(e) Before a child custody determination is made, reasonable no-
Ttice and opportunity to be heard shall be given to the contestants, any 
parent whose parental rights have not been previously terminated 
and any person who has physical custody of a child 
(f) A court of a State may modify a determination of the custody of 
the same child made by a court of another State, if— 
(1) it has jurisdiction to make such a child custody determina-
tion, and 
(2) the court of the other State no longer has jurisdiction, or it 
has declined to exercise such jurisdiction to modify such deter-
mination 
(g) A court of a State shall not exercise jurisdiction in any proceed-
ing for a custody determination commenced during the pendency of 
a proceeding in a court of another State where such court of that 
other State is exercising jurisdiction consistently with the provisions 
of this section to make a custody deteimination 
(Added Pub L 96-611 § 8(a), Dec 28, 1980 94 Stat 3569) 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Congressional Findings and Declaration 
of Purpose 
Section 7 of Pub L 96-611 provided 
that 
(a) The Congress finds that— 
(1) there is a large and growing 
number of cases annually involving dis 
putes between persons claiming rights 
of custody and visitation of children 
under the laws and in the courts of 
different States the District of Colum-
bia the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico 
and the territories and possessions of 
the United States 
(2) the laws and practices by which 
the couits of those jurisdictions deter 
mine their jurisdiction to decide such 
disputes and the effect to be given the 
decisions of such disputes by the courts 
of othei jurisdictions are often incon 
sistent and conflicting 
(3) those characteristics of the law 
and practice in such cases along with 
the limits imposed by a Federal system 
on the authority of each such junsdic 
tion to conduct investigations and take 
other actions outside its own bound 
anes contribute to a tendency of par 
ties involved in such disputes to fre 
quently resort to the seizure restraint 
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concealment, and interstate transporta-
tion of children, the disregard of court 
orders, excessive relitigation of cases, 
obtaining of conflicting orders by the 
courts of various jurisdictions, and in-
terstate travel and communication that 
is so expensive and time consuming as 
to disrupt their occupations and com-
mercial activities; and 
"(4) among the results of those con-
ditions and activities are the failure of 
the courts of such jurisdictions to give 
full faith and credit to the judicial pro-
ceedings of the other jurisdictions, the 
deprivation of rights of liberty and 
property without due process of law, 
burdens on commerce among such jur-
isdictions and with foreign nations, and 
harm to the welfare of children and 
their parents and other custodians. 
"(b) For those reasons it is necessary 
to establish a national system for locating 
parents and children who travel from one 
such jurisdiction to another and are con-
cealed in connection with such disputes, 
and to establish national standards under 
which the courts of such jurisdictions will 
determine their jurisdiction to decide 
such disputes and the effect to be given 
by each such jurisdiction to such deci-
sions by the courts of other such jurisdic-
tions. 
"(c) The general purposes of sections 6 
to 10 of this Act [enacting this section and 
sections 654(17) and 663 of Title 42, The 
Public Health and Welfare, amending 
section 655(a) of Title 42, and enacting 
provisions set out as notes under this 
section and sections 663 and 1305 of Title 
42 and 1073 of Title 18, Crimes and 
Criminal Procedure] are to— 
"(1) promote cooperation between 
State courts to the end that a determi-
nation of custody and visitation is ren-
dered in the State which can best de-
cide the case in the interest of the 
child; 
"(2) promote and expand the ex-
change of information and other forms 
of mutual assistance between States 
which are concerned with the same 
child; 
"(3) facilitate the enforcement of 
custody and visitation decrees of sister 
States; 
"(4) discourage continuing interstate 
controversies over child custody in the 
interest of greater stability of home en-
vironment and of secure family rela-
tionships for the child; 
"(5) avoid jurisdictional competition 
and conflict between State courts in 
matters of child custody and visitation 
which have in the past resulted in the 
shifting of children from State to State 
with harmful effects on their well-be-
ing; and 
"(6) deter interstate abductions and 
other unilateral removals of children 
undertaken to obtain custody and visi-
tation awards." 
State Court Proceedings for Custody De-
terminations; Priority Treatment; 
Fees, Costs, and Other Expenses 
Section 8(c) of Pub.L. 96-611 provided 
that: "In furtherance of the purposes of 
section 1738A of title 28, United States 
Code [this section], as added by subsec-
tion (a) of this section, State courts are 
encouraged to— 
"(1) afford priority to proceedings 
for custody determinations; and 
"(2) award to the person entitled to 
custody or visitation pursuant to a cus-
tody determination which is consistent 
with the provisions of such section 
1738A [this section], necessary travel 
expenses, attorneys' fees, costs of pri-
vate investigations, witness fees or^ex-
penses, and other expenses incurred IlV 
connection with such custody detennJjj 
nation in any case in which— 
"(A) a contestant has, without 1 
consent of the person entitled to C 
tody or visitation pursuant to a c" 
dy determination which is consti 
with the provisions of such 
1738A [this section], (i) wron 
removed the child from the Pn 
custody of such person, or (iu 1 
fully retained the child after a i 
other temporary relinquishme 
physical custody; or 
"(B) the court determines it 1 
propriate." 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
American Digest System 
Admissibility of public records and documents, and acts, records, and p 
of other states, see Evidence <®=>331, 346 et seq. 
Proceedings to determine right to custody of child, and enforcemen 
order, see Parent and Child <£=>2(4) et seq. 
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1 (Monday, Angus4" 19 o n n o Q * « \ 
2 1 PLAINTIFF AND TH? ____'ENDANT 
3 -i, :>> f * TR ANSPIREi ,. , 
4 THE COURT: All ri ght Now, th i s i s Li nary Kingdon 
51 versus Bri an Ki ngdon, civil action number 02-V-188. 
6 I have Ms . Bo] In here representing Li narv I igdon, ai id 
7 believe also the children are herr, :)>•.; we have ¥ 
8 Ki ngdoi I 1: I sre pro se 
9 M:i : Kingdon has ai lswered this matter and basical 1 y 
10 he says that Utah has proper jurisdiction DI I tl i i s 
] ] ma tter But th i s :i s 1:1 le case 'w 1: ler e I • = a] rea ij 
12 conferred with the Utah judge; is that correct? 
13 MS. BOLIN: That j s correct, Your Honor, 
14 THE ;:!C)l IR T'I I t ighl : I h a< a 1 I v i i 1 1 I 3 udge I .i \ :i ngstc i , 
15 Mr. Kingdon. You've seen my order f I believe? 
16 j MR. KINGDON: Yes f Yoi ir Honor. 
THE COURT: Now, why shouldi I 1 th i s order be 
1 •-: control li ng? 
1 MI [ K I N G D O N T l .< 3 c e a s o i l,, \ t HI HI MM I I I I I Il II Il 1 1 n II i i 
the Parental Kidnapping Preventioi i Act of 1 980 
2 THE COURT: The what? 
2 . MR I [INGDON 1 1: it \ I 
2 the State of Utah should have proper jurisdiction ol 
2 .tin is matter,, 
2 . THE COURT? For what reason — I — - - l^t's r^r> 
H a d n I ! Ii" ""Il i k i l l *:!' i i i ( i s I ' i l ' iM l . hwi. <•• II ni l I I Il jilll s i x 
months? 
Ml L KINGDOM: No. Your Honor. 
THE COURT , see • One child has. That s 
right. 
INI II I II 1 N(?l>< i n " D m i I in II ill „ i ' i " i ii'" H I I d m i mi 
THE COURT O n e c h i l d h a s a m i y e a h , I r e m e n h n r 
d i s c u s s i i iq t h i s w i t h . f i i d q p I i i v i n q s t o n . B a s i c a l l y , w e 
d i s c u s tii (III mi I in I I i in 11 Ii IIIIII I  I  I i I  ih in I  III Il II I ill in II III 
that Georgia was the propei torum tot jurisdiction. 
Pinl pursuant to Lhe Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Act, we met — we talked on MM 1 phone and 
wo swapped the paperwork back and forth and both talked 
ahum! i, I'iiMii. Ihid I h r m o ; ; I 'fjiii! .ii'"1! r, liiciF II I .-ii 'H J 'j'here I h o 
c h i l d r e n have Lived, i ml wo bo th agrcsed t h a t G e o r g i a was 
t h e p r o p e r p l a c e f o r j u r i s d i c t i on . 
M1 i K i" N< ": 11 ' IH 1 "  1 1 I I in i 11 in I mi mi I J i s c H j i e e
 f t 11 11 in 1 1 1 1 „ i 1 1 . 1 1 
t h e p r o p e r f orun* \ s Geo rg i a and - • 
THE COURT: I i m d e r s t a n d . Now, Mr • Kingdon , I /lit 
goi ng tc m: :i,o t 3 y :>ii i i: :i i • =;agi: eement ai id 1 'm :|r< :: d i: l g tc i i ::: -te 
y o u r o b j e c t i o n f o r t h e r e c o r d t o t h a t f i n d i n g of Judge 
I ii :i i lgs tc u i • a n ::l my s e ] f = .i it I y oui : r e c o u r s e a b o u t . t h a t 
would be t o a p p e a l t o «n liii)In:i c o u r t . 
MR. KINGDON: Ye;,., Yom Honor Il have a p p e a l e d . 
IIIIII II II ill .1 II II ,"I, I I Ill III 1 1 I m i o J 
Court here for the purposes n *" appeal regarding the 
1 11 i M I i el i I M I -
THE COUIH liu dheatJL Say anyUmiitj yum il l i k e . 
Ml/ FTNGDON: Yom Honni , undci I lio P a r e n t a l 
1 i i l l i n , 1 1 1 ] 1 1 in i [ l J j o w n « i i ! | i ii in mi in i Il Il II 'II III III III || in, in II w i l i i i a ] ! y 
d e s i g n e d t o t a k e c a r e ot j u r i s d i c t i o n a l m a t t e i s l i k e 
thif i whoio a l i n n - r u s t o d i a 1 p a r en t would l a b 1 a c h i l d • -
a n o t h e i u t a t u wheie I.In y I i • I I I In y \ HI I d Il i l l , i i in 
f avo rab le ! r u l i n g r e g a r d i n g c h i l d j u r i s d i c t i o n . 
Il ill I In in • [iail ion I in mi mai-»f% 1 ho o r i q i n i l r h i l d c u s t o d y 
o r d e r was e s t a b l i s h e d in Kansas in HH'l I I n i • 11 i n L l n i 1 
p a s t \\ in in n i l I n i in1 I I I In i d * 2 0 0 2 , t h e r e w a s a n o r d e r 
o n I i • i t i I  mi mi in I II11 'I in I I  111 it 11 < i i I 111 I in 11 "I i" i H i J I n I .' in I t L a k e 
C i t y o r S a l t Lake County , Utah Ami I In • o l d e r was 
f o r m o d i f i c a t i o n id tha i o r i g i n a l Kansas o r d e r . 
"1 n i i u do i iivya i don • >p I i i i in nf t id y i i in | in i 
The order was done pursuant to the Uniform Chi la Cu-t««j.. 
and if in Lsdiction of the State of Utah, and the plaint-1 if 
in this case agreed JIM iii-hrl im, ,, ', 
court. 
TIK-M I I o l i eve i t was J - 1 - ! -* alter th^ 
y o u n g e s t oi I.ho* c h i l d r e n , S t a c y - - <- , ,, ?en awarded 
t o UP in th<=> s p l i t - c u s t o d y a r r a n g e m e n t , and s h e ' d coma 
o ... \ ' i l l Hi I  nicil hi i I "ilia , l a y oi l w i ' h l u " ii", i " In I 
And t h e r e were -• tiiei v wore c h a r g e s made? - - t h e r e were* 
4 
allegations made of child abuse. 
i nal eiiiJ in 11( 11 in I 1 iiii" I in I " " "in i * I t he 
p l a i n t i f f s i m p l y opened up a c h i l d cus tody p r o c e e d i n g 
h e r e i G e o r g i a , and t h i s Cour t a <-- *«- t e m p o r a r y 
c u s t o d y lu tin [j l a i n I i I I mil i I I III 
h e a r d , 
tJiirloi ( hn" Iriwo of bo th t h e s t a t e ni Utah and I hr 
s t a t e oL G e o r g i a , t h e p a r t i e s — when t h e r e H |oim.j I 
bo a communica t ion be tween t h e C o u r t s r e g a r d i n g 
j u it i :,• < 1 ii n " 11 veil a c h a n c e t o 
p a r t i c i p a t e :i  i t, t h o s e p r o c e e d i n g s • And, Your Honor, 1 
was n e v e r ab l e t o • - I was never a l lowed t o pan t i c i p a t e 
t l i ' l I i i i » I > H 'i I i iHJ J fcitja J d J In j I I I T ' II II i i J l I J . l t i , 
And what 1 b e l i e v e lias happened , Your Honor, i s 
t h a t bo th t i i r r n u r t in HI. In nn -I horn in G e o r g i a h a s 
r e l i e d uiii i i i t u i m a l i o r i pJ<a/Hkil l>r JIIMIMI i l l i uinik i nq 
t h e i r d e c i s i o n and t h a t t h a t i n f o r m a t i o n has e i t h e r been 
i IIJIII "oiopl el (•< I mi i nr'i i r r e c t . 
I1"1! j I. I 1 lie lie a r t >d I In i s s u e of t h i s c a s e i s t h e r e s 
a major d i f f e r e n c e be tween t h e laws of t h e s ta te* of Utal; I 
and. t l i€ • : f Georgi a i: e g a r ii :i n g t:l: i = 
c h o i c e of a c h i l d a s 10 t h e i r c u s t o d i a l p a r e n t w i l l 
b e . 
The state oi Georgia recognizee Uial (In hi al .ii|i 
fourteen Is -- In a pretty much the right to choose which 
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c u s t o d x a J p a r e n t t h e y waul In III i n i l h Hmwi " 'a i , MI 
t h e s t a i v e l id a h , t h e law j-i v e i y much d i f f e r e n t , a n d 
in I li | in I! i 11 in I in I I III in d i ' M i r e d t h a t t h i s m a t t e r b e h e a r d 
h e r e i n G e o r g i a . 
THE COURT: Does Utah h a v e a c h i l d e l e c t i o n law? 
Il III1 IK ( I I I i l ir IN III Hi nun HI „ i i i l 1 III mi I ill i w a a e 
o T . Ami in m a t t e r s l i k e i b i s , Youi l l o n o i , t h e t a r e n t a i I 
K i d n a p p i n g P r e v e n t i o n Act of I " 11111 d e s i g n e d In 
p r e v e n t p a r e n t , - I i i HIIII liil MH| i I i i I 111 i in I mil In i I • • • 11 in 
where they thought they would i j«• 1 . m m a favorable 
mi in in I mi i i i 
Ami t h e UniLurm CILLIIJ LiUiUuly Aaiii-i nt l in lh b e u i * j i a 
a n d U l a h a r e d e s i g n e d In f o l l o w t h e P a r e n t a l K i d n a p p i n g 
I" i n v e n l mi 11 mi in ' n II i'1 MI in i II II I in mi i in i M i i i N " , s k e i n s r 1 e a r l " .m 
c a s e where a p a i e n l i muni c u s t o d i a l p a r e n t in i lu i i 
c a s e has t a k e n a c h i l d ami sought for a n o t h e r foruni, and 
III I III ' *. I I U l i i f l I y I H ' 1 M Ml II I h i II II I I I « . Il , I II l i i II I II II I II I II II III 
proper forum• 
THE COURT: For both chi 1 dren? 
f Ill I IK l i iC' i l l i . l l lNI , III'11 mi II II ii in p i n I i e m II a i aasi , I I  i> s t a i 
of Utah made a custody order, a custody modification. 
order „ and 1 :1: le state of Utah — they made that —- they 
made that custody order properly accor ding to the ] a ws 
of U tc .1 I EIII ir: .• I E 1 • ;• : • :i in accordance with the Parental 
K. i dnapp. ii iig I i : c > i e n t::i oi i Ac :i ., \ ?i i :ii I: i p u : e v : i i ] i ; • ii Ill: I .he i •< i s 
difference between state laws. 
And t.ho court ol Utah continues to exercise 
) t l l I s J j L t . l i i H i i J • • i I* i l l n l i i i i H i l n l i" 1 i l m i p p i HUM i 1" J" '- 'WCI i ! 1 i i 
A c t a s 1 onq c\i\ t h e c h i l d of o n " oJ Lhe p a r e n t s s t i l l 
i e,s 1 c\n\ i in III .ill I s t i l l i PH i fin i 11 I he ^i a t e of III" a h 
and I hi iiiidcj Ilit" P a r e n t a l K i d n a p p i n g P i u v e n l ion A< 
t h i s c a s e s h o u l d s t i l l p r o p e r l y b e i r III ili. 
A n i l I t 11 II in mi in 11 i M i 1 I in ili II11 ,111 " , M ' i y
 s imiL JLO.JL Lo t h x t > . 
It's called Cur tis vs. Cur tis and -
THE COUNT: Do you have a ci tie on that? 
I II I: C I N G D O N : 5f< \i J ! ! • r m, i EIJ r i c u • ' 
THE COURT: Is that a Georgia case? 
MR. KINGDON: It :i s a Utah case, Your Honor 
THE COI J R T 1 1 ] \ i gl: I 3< • , il: ic u i I J: id i •< u I I J : i< • c : i 1 
into the record. 
MR. KTNGDON: Okay, I Iv • I be seated, Your Honor? 
THE l.'OUKT; «!!ei Laini;> 
MR. KINGDON: Thank y o u . And I a p o l o g i z e , Your 
H c»i II ir in in f ii 
T H E C O U R f l a iere 's no prob] em at al] , Mi • Kingdon , 
You're doing a good job 
1 1 [• I K J N ( 1 1 > t " ) II J , "  III"" II in • 1 1 1 IK / 1 1 » C u r t i s v s . Cur t i s , 7 8!| 
P . 2d 7 17 11 i of A p p e a l s Il "r>01). 
THE COURli. w r v d l v T h a n k y o u . r*n^ wi ia t d o e s t h a i -
c a s e s a y ? 
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MR KING DUN : Y u u i. Honor, I 11.; 11 « a,, «,i a a i; < \t 11 * • i t - a 
non-custodial father took his children to the state of 
Mlissi ssippi n I ^iperiad | i rhi Id « ustody proceedinq in 
the state ol Mississippi The oniginal order J:or that 
custody was in the state ol lllhili 
i ;"! in ,1 i i l l i . i I li i i | j p e . n e < l i1' ii I In I 1 in«iil 
case were that the father tried to open up the child 
custody case in Mississippi and completely ignored the 
s t a t e o t U t alii Ill » 1111*1 <M WVIIIII l ia* . I i, I II III" ' < 1 1 I -MI I l i 
continui ng jurisdiction. 
I Ill:, '"i ; as a ] s :> th :i s particu I ar c ase was a 1 s• :> on the 
basis of a 11 eged. ch:i 1 d abuse. From the 1: e, 11: r ES 1:e we 1:e 
proceedings i 1: 1 bo tin states . The mother of the chi ldren 
i 1 1 thi s case we 1 11 dowi 1 to th< sf ate of Mi ssissi ppi and 
made an appearance in the court 1 11 Mississippi, 
There was a ruJ :i ng ultimately from, the cour t ii 1 
Mi ssJLss i (,»{jj I !ia I. KHIC I li A I I hi-' f a t h e r si: 1 ::: 1  ill d he a; e 
c u s t o d y o f t h e c h i l d r e n And t h e c o m : t i n I Jtal: 1 • t h e 
*-r-i^ - c o u r t i n U tah a l s o s a i d t h a t , b e c a u s e s h e h a d made 
.)p<--Mi a net ' il 11 I I in I •?( in in 1 I i n r | i s s i s s i p p i
 |( 11:1 la It till: l a t 
gav- the court" in Mississippi jurisdiction, regarding the 
case. 
She appeal] ed the matter. The Utah Cc 1 1 1 : t of Appeals 
overturned the Utah trial court'; .
 t ; based 
f:i 1 id :i 1 lg Il::l:: ,a I: because of tl: a 
8 
a i 1 • a t temf t I: .• : i : M : >m< = I D a c l : t : • Il :1: .• ; • I J1 i .1 : :oi 1:1 : t b : • sett] e tl :ie 
matter and because the mother was stiJ ] a resident of 
I (i( '" Pit (T| t O of" IJ1,' t i l l i • J L O U U U that the Utah court had 
jui isdictxoii o< Uio matter. 
'Till11 case is very similar ' -y opinion, to this 
r a s P
 ( Y mil ll< 11 in (I mi , I  o v i'" 11 11 a v o v e a c opy o f i t 
h e r e i l ; t h e t l o u t t w o u l d l i k e t o h a v e IJiaL o r —• 
THE COURT? AI 1 t iqh l - I ' l l l a k e a copy Thank 
<i HI r "I i I' i i i t j du i i I " " , , , !
 v. I, ,i . . . ; M . . " 
here for your benelit really, Mi , Kingdun i m i i 
have a 
l l l l l i < H I III III i l l I I I 1 1 „ i 1 1 I I . 
TBK COURT: I s wllli.il wo need t o do i s p r o b a b l y 
qot jioino t e s t i m o n y a-, o p p o s e d In you inak inq l i k e rin 
a r g u m e n t , l i k e an aLLuint'1,1 , l| ML ink UJIIJI1 wo nrnU--ildy 
n e e d t o d o I s p u t some t e s t i m o n y on s o t h a t we c a n 
!i. In si m in I' 1 an *\ h • -
, • . KINGDON. Yuh, Yutu Honor. 
THE COURT: In this matter thai; wil 1 give yon a 
Jjfit? i i:» 1 i(?(!"«,'." I n . 
MR. KINGDOM: '— Tr~~ vour Honor. 
THE COURT: So who'^ the moving' party ; -mj . _ . 
Boli n* 
: . J. . , • . • • 
'!"'' * • • W e si a r t e d 
y 
I I \ i I Ii ,m ox -riai t o m a t t e r ;• i s t ti.il c o r r e c t ? 
MS. BOLIM: WeJ 1 , v-e 1 i J od l o i ' IMIKJO ol i s i o d y , 
Your Honoi . "Tim n wo wen t i n t o an e x p a r t e . 
Till*1 COUNT' And II i - i I" omporar } •— this is not 
a d Lvo rce ; r i g h L ? 
MS BOLIN: No, s i i . 
I Mi It I M<il H ' I I . I l l I , I l HI I III MM I I . 
Till1 COURT" T h i s i s \ • ••  what , a m o d i f i c a t i o n of 
c u s t o d y I'OT o n e c h i l d ; i £i 1 lint, r i g h t ? 
M i l H O I l l ti , II r. , i ( . .1 ' I - - ! ' ' • 
I i l l . COURT™ D IMIY . 
IT urn in The m o t h e r a i r e a d y h a d c u s t o d y of t h e j 
o t h e i : c h i l d , 
1
 COURT: A l l r i g h t . W e l l , y o u ' r e t h e m o v i n g ? 
p a i t y , I mi Hi i I i II iinl b a n i o a l i y w h a t I r e g a r d a s t o -
Ill i I 1  III Kingdon s a i d I s b a s i c a l l y l i k e an o p e n i n g 
a r g u m e n t . 
A n d , ' i, ' ' | i ><> n 1 , . ' , 'M nii i in >n t s y« <i 
w o u l d in mi I I , i H I i l I I n II mi mi mi l e t y o u I MI i tio r e u o i d , 
whal I " 11 l i k e t o do i s e s t a b 1 i sh f rom Mrs . K i n g d o n - -
and wo i i p i uilh.jlLj I y In ai II mm I In g u In I I u i . 
t h e i r p r e f e r e n c e on y o u r oa.se s i n c e t h e r e ' s -•• you d e a r ' 
ha\ r\ i.i |Mii i i i c ' l i i i l l t" i d a v i t s f rom t h e m ? 
MS. BOLIN: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. That's a preferred course of 
1 0 
action usually, is just to have a written election from 
them. But since they're here and they're sitting in the 
courtroom anyway, then we can just put them on the stand 
and let them tell us what their preference is if the 
parties don't have any objection. 
But why don't we hear from you in the way of 
opening remarks if you have any, then let's put Mrs. 
Kingdon or whoever you wish to call on the stand and 
let's just briefly get the facts out about where the 
children have lived and the fact pattern of how we've 
come to be here in court. 
And then Mr. Kingdon can ask questions and then we 
can hear from Mr. Kingdon under oath as well and that 
will give us — me an opportunity to make some findings 
of fact in this matter that may be helpful to everybodyf 
Utah courts, Georgia courts, or anybody else who takes a 
look at this. Ms. Bolin, any remarks you want to make? 
MS. BOLIN: Yesf Your Honor. The action was 
actually commenced because the child came to Georgia and 
refused to return to Utah. And as a result of her 
refusal, the mother filed a motion to change custody and 
we notified the Court and asked for an ex parte because 
time was of the essence. The child was scheduled to 
return. The mother did not want to be in contempt. 
And based on the facts as they were verified to me 
11 
by the child in question, we did file an ex parte. The 
father was served and subsequently, in accordance with 
the UCJEEA, both judges from both states had 
conversation• 
I believe that orders — in fact, I know for a fact 
that orders were issued by the state of Utah. Roger 
Livingston, the Honorable Superior Court Judge there, as 
well as the Honorable Robert Russell concurred and both 
agreed that jurisdiction should be placed in the Georgia 
courts. 
Since that time, Mr. Kingdon has filed appeals and 
I understand — 
THE COURT: Appeals? 
MS. BOLIN: Yes, Your Honor, appeals to that 
decision. I understand that he's filed an appeal with 
the Utah — 
THE COURT: Utah court? 
MR. KINGDON: With the Utah court, yes. 
THE COURT: Well, there's no appeal that's been 
filed here. 
MS. BOLIN: No, sir, but the Court of Appeals in 
Utah, and he has filed an appeal there on the 
jurisdictional issue alone. 
THE COURT: Okay, very well. Call your first 
witness. 
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1 MS- BOLIN: Okay. Plaintiff calls Linary Kingdon. 
2 THE COURT: Right up heref Mrs. Kingdon. 
3 (WITNESS APPROACHES THE WITNESS STAND) 
4 L I N A R Y K I N G D O N , having been duly sworn, took t h e 
5 stand and testified as follows: 
6 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
7 BY MS. BOLIN: 
8 Q Please state your name. 
9 A Linary Kingdon. 
10 Q You're going to need to speak up a little bit 
11 louder. 
12 A Is this on? 
13 THE COURT: It doesn't amplify. It just records, 
14 so speak louder. 
15 A Linary Kingdon. 
16 Q (By Ms. Bolin: ) And, Mrs. Kingdon, where do you 
17 reside? 
18 A In Darien, Georgia. 
19 Q And how long have you resided in Georgia? 
20 A Total time? A little over six years. 
21 Q And by "total," what does that mean? 
22 A I lived in Kingsland from — in St. Marys from '91 
23 to '94 and then relocated to Oregon for five years and then 
24 moved back here in March of '99. 
25 Q So you've been here now a total of how many months 
13 
1 or years since your second return or your return back to 
2 Georgia? 
3 A Okay. Three years and five months. 
4 Q But did you live here at least six months prior to 
5 filing this action? 
6 A Yesf almost two years. 
7 Q And you have two — how many children do you have? 
8 A Two. 
9 Q And what are their names? 
10 A Julie and Stacy. 
11 Q And what are their birthdays? 
12 A Julie is July 11th, '86, and she's sixteen. And 
13 Stacy is March 5th, '88, and she is fourteen. 
14 Q And are those parties present? 
15 A Yes. 
16 Q Who has custody of those children? 
17 A Because of the recent things, I do. 
18 Q And the custody issue arose as a result of what? 
19 I'll rephrase that. Were you married to Mr. Kingdon? 
20 A Yes, from — 
21 Q When were y'all divorced? 
22 A September 11th, 1989. 
23 Q And at the time of your divorce, what was the 
24 custody arrangement? 
25 A Joint custody and physical residency with me. 
14 
Q And has that changed during the years? 
A It did in June of this year. 
Q And what was that change? 
A The change was to shift custody of Stacy to her 
dad. 
THE COURT: That was June of this year? 
MS. BOLIN: June 11th, Your Honorf I believe. 
THE WITNESS: May or June? 
MR. KINGDON: June llthf Your Honor. 
MS. BOLIN: It was — 
MR. KINGDON: The order was entered June 11th. 
THE COURT: In Utah? 
MR. KINGDON: In Utah, yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And until June 11th, where had the 
child been? With you? 
THE WITNESS: Back and forth mostly with me, but a 
little bit with her dad when she wanted to live with 
him. 
THE COURT: And where was the child going to 
school? 
THE WITNESS: Depending where she lived. 
THE COURT: She went to both schools? 
MR. KINGDON: Your Honor, both — both children 
have lived with me at various times. Most recently, 
Stacy resided with me from July 17th, 2001 until she 
15 
1 came out here to visit her mother June 4th, 2002. So 
2 she had been in Utah for nearly a year before the order 
3 was entered in Utah. 
4 Q (By Ms. Bolin:) During that time, Mrs. Kingdon, 
5 who was the official custodial parent of Stacy? 
6 A I was• 
7 Q And as a result of your child visiting you this 
8 summer, what happened? 
9 A She told me about the environment at home in Utah, 
10 and it didn't sound like a healthy one at all and she didn't 
11 want to return. 
12 Q And what was your response to that? 
13 A I needed to pursue legal help because I had just 
14 shifted custody to her dad and I couldn't just make her stay 
15 or — I needed to follow the law. 
16 Q Were y'all represented by counsel when you filed 
17 that consent order? 
18 A Brian did it, and at the time we were in agreement 
19 with the situation as it was at that time. 
20 Q And were you in agreement with that order until 
21 July or — excuse me — until June of this year? 
22 A To change custody? 
23 Q Uh-huh. 
24 A Right, as long as — yeah, until I knew about other 
25 things. 
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1 Q Exactly what did you learn that made you change 
2 your mind? 
3 A That Stacy was very stressed, and being in Utah the 
4 worst part is that she had gotten to the point where she was 
5 inflicting bodily injury to herself and had contemplated 
6 suicide. 
7 Q At any point in time did you refuse to allow her to 
8 return to Utah? 
9 A Never. In fact, I encouraged her even sometimes 
10 when she didn't want to go. 
11 Q In spite of the danger to herself? 
12 A Well, no. This time I didn't encourage her, but I 
13 made sure that what she had told me was true. 
14 Q And how did you make sure of that? 
15 A Well, I helped — made sure she understood the 
16 importance of the things she was saying, that if it wasn't 
17 true, you know, that that's very bad. And some of the things 
18 she had told me, I contacted people in Utah that I could 
19 follow through to verify that what she had said was true. 
20 And then a lot of it just boils down to I had to believe her 
21 or her dad, and from my experience, I'm much more able to 
22 trust her. 
23 Q Is it — is it your opinion that it's in the 
24 child's best interest to remain in Georgia? 
25 A Yes. 
17 
1 MS, BOLIN: That's allf Your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: Any questions, Mr. Kingdon, for Mrs. 
3 Kingdon? 
4 MR. KINGDON: Yes, Your Honor. 
5 THE COURT: You can stay seated if you'd like. 
6 MR. KINGDON: Yesf sir. Thank you, Your Honor. 
7 Your Honor, should I be sworn in before — 
8 THE COURT: You're asking questions right now. 
9 MR. KINGDON: Okay. Thank you. 
10 THE COURT: You're not testifying. You're asking 
11 questions. 
12 MR. KINGDON: Yes, sir. 
13 CROSS-EXAMINATION OF LINARY KINGDON 
14 BY MR. KINGDON: 
15 Q Linary, can you tell the Court what evidence you 
16 have that there was abuse in this case? Can you — 
17 A Her emotional demeanor when she was talking about 
18 it. I did see some scars on her wrists. Non-physical 
19 evidence would be having talked to the assistant principal at 
20 the school where she went when she asked to be taken into 
21 protective — a protective situation to be away from home in 
22 Utah. Those are the only ones I can think of right now. 
23 Q Linary, did you provide this Court with a list of 
24 the addresses where you have lived in the past five years and 
25 also of the names of the people who Stacy has resided with? 
18 
1 A Was I supposed to? 
2 Q Yes. 
3 A Oh. No, I didn't. 
4 Q You did not. Can you please tell the Court where 
5 you have lived going back to — well, in your — in your 
6 deposition of the court, you started with where you had lived 
7 in 1994. Can you go back — can you go back to the time when 
8 we were divorced in Kansas and tell the Court where you and 
9 the children have resided since — 
10 MS. BOLIN: Your Honor, I object to that. They've 
11 been — they've been divorced since 1989, I believe. 
12 For her to go back and to list all that, I think, is 
13 irrelevant. 
14 THE COURT: The question was about what were the 
15 reasons for the divorce? 
16 MR. KINGDON: No. The question was regarding where 
17 the plaintiff and the children have resided since the 
18 divorce. 
19 THE COURT: Since the divorce. Well, let's just go 
20 back five years. Let's see. That will be — 
21 MR. KINGDON: That's fine. 
22 THE COURT: Yeah, let's —- that would be, what, 
23 1997? 
24 MR. KINGDON: 1997. 
25 THE COURT: All right. 
19 
MR. KINGDON: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Answer the question — 
THE WITNESS: Okay. 
THE COURT: -- from 1997. 
A '97, I was in — 
THE COURT: Well, let me — let me see if — let me 
ask this to see if I can speed this up. The — I'm 
looking at Mr. Kingdoms answer, and basically, you 
know — neither party has really filed the affidavit, 
you know, even though I've requested that. 
The — and Mr. Kingdon mentioned — said it hadn't 
been filed. But this is what Mr. Kingdon says as far as 
Stacy goes. The child lived with her father from June 
1994 through December 1994, from August 1996 to May 
1997, from August 1999 through December 1999, and from 
July 17th, 2001 to July — June 4th, 2002. Do you agree 
with that? 
THE WITNESS: (Nods head) 
THE COURT: Answer out loud. 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. I think that satisfies what 
you — 
MR. KINGDON: Yes. Yes, Your — 
THE COURT: — were trying to get. 
MR. KINGDON: Yes, Your Honor. 
20 
1 THE COURT: Proceed. 
2 MR. KINGDON: Okay. 
3 Q (By Mr. Kingdon: ) When the — how did the whole 
4 issue of having the defendant, myself, having custody of 
5 Stacy — how did all of that come about? Can you tell the 
6 Court about that? 
7 A Say your question again. 
8 Q Can you tell — can you please tell the court why 
9 it is that you agreed to a change of custody? 
10 A Oh, okay. All right. Stacy was living with you in 
11 eighth grade. Child — Utah was still pulling child support 
12 out of your check to send to me for both children, and the 
13 plan was that Stacy would stay with you through high school. 
14 And so in order to straighten out — so you weren't paying 
15 for her when she was with me, Utah says that we would have to 
16 go through the court system legally and change custody. 
17 Q So you recognized the jurisdiction of Utah? You 
18 agreed that Utah had proper jurisdiction in the case? 
19 A They were the ones that had to take the money out 
20 of your check for child support. So, yeah, they were 
21 handling it at that point. 
22 Q And then you were aware at the time when Stacy came 
23 out to — pardon me. Can you tell the Court about when 
24 Stacy — or when Stacy came to visit you after being in Utah 
25 this past time? Can you tell — 
21 
1 A Like tell about the visit? 
2 Q Can you tell the Court when that occurred, when 
3 Stacy came back to visit you? 
4 A Well, let's see. June 4thf she flew here to visit 
5 me. 
6 Q Okay. And she's resided — she's resided here in 
7 Darien since that time? 
8 A Correct. 
9 Q Did — were — at that time that she resided with 
10 you, were you — were you given notice that custody had been 
11 changed in Utah by the Utah court? 
12 A Huh-uh, no. 
13 Q When did you receive notice that custody had been 
14 changed? 
15 A July something. I don't recall the date. 
16 Q Okay. When you kept Stacyf did you do so knowing 
17 that there was — that you had already agreed to a change of 
18 custody in Utah through the Utah court? When you kept Stacy 
19 here in Georgia during her last visit, did you — did you 
20 know that there — a change was imminent in the Utah court? 
21 A We were in the process of doing what needed to be 
22 done. 
23 Q Okay. Have you ever attempted to change the 
24 custody modification that was entered June 11th in the 3rd 
25 Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County? Have you ever 
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1 attempted to change that custody through that forum? 
2 MS. BOLIN: Your Honor, I object. She obviously 
3 has because she's here today and that change of custody 
4 was based on a significant change in circumstances. I 
5 would object to the — 
6 THE COURT: Well, I think he's asking about like 
7 filing a petition — 
8 MR. KINGDON: Yes. 
9 THE COURT: — for modification in the Utah 
10 court — 
11 MR. KINGDON: Yes, Your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: — is what he asked about. 
13 MR. KINGDON: Yes, Your Honor. 
14 A I haven't done that paperwork, but I sent them a 
15 letter prior to the date when she was supposed to return to 
16 let them know that I needed to do something. 
17 Q (By Mr. Kingdon:) Have you ever — have you since 
18 that point filed any papers in the courts in Utah? 
19 A My lawyer's taken care of that for me. 
20 Q So ~ 
21 THE COURT: The answer is no at this time. 
22 A Oh, I myself, no. 
23 THE COURT: Well, anybody on your behalf or 
24 yourself has not filed any papers in Utah; is that 
25 correct? 
23 
THE WITNESS: You have or haven't? 
MS. BOLIN: Your Honor, we've filed everything in 
the Utah courts. They have been apprised of these 
actions as was proved by the orders — 
THE COURT: What Mr. Kingdon wants to know, has any 
formal legal paperwork been filed in the Utah courts, 
like a petition for modification there, is what he's 
asking. 
MR. KINGDON: Yes, Your Honor. 
MS. BOLIN: A petition for modification was not 
filed there, but a petition for modification in the 
Georgia courts, based on a significant change of 
circumstances, was filed. 
THE COURT: I understand, but the question is, has 
any paperwork been filed in Utah. That's what — formal 
legal paperwork, motion, petition. 
MS. BOLIN: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: The answer is — 
MS. BOLIN: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: — no; is that correct? 
THE WITNESS: Correct, I think. 
THE COURT: Okay. That's what -- that's what he 
wants to know. 
MR. KINGDON: That was my question, Your Honor. 
Thank you. 
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1 THE COURT: All right. Proceed. 
2 Q (By Mr. Kingdon: ) Linary, can you tell the Court 
3 why you wanted to have the custody modification that was done 
4 in Utah — why you wanted to have that custody modification 
5 done here through the Georgia court system? 
6 A Why here instead of Utah? 
7 Q Yes. 
8 A Wellf because this is where — Georgia is where 
9 Stacy considers her home more than Utah. I've been here for 
10 an extended period of time. I was working, so it was hard 
11 for me to leave. You weren't working, so you could leave 
12 Utah. It just seemed more appropriate to me. 
13 Q Okay. Did your desire to have the Georgia court 
14 take jurisdiction of this case — did it have anything to do 
15 with the fact that there is a difference between Georgia and 
16 Utah law regarding the choice of the child? 
17 A No, because I didn't know about that. 
18 Q Yet did you state in your affidavit — or excuse 
19 me — in your petition to this Court that for a modification 
20 or change that the child — or that the Court should modify 
21 the order based on the fact that the child was age fourteen? 
22 A Say that again. 
23 Q In your petition to this Court here, did you state 
24 that you should be given custody of Stacy because she is age 
25 fourteen and under — was that one of the reasons that was 
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1 stated to this Court why you should have custody of Stacy at 
2 this time? 
3 A I don't recall if I stated that. That's not the 
4 reason I think I should have custody. 
5 MR. KINGDON: Okay. Your Honor — 
6 THE COURT: Any more questions for Mrs. Kingdon? 
7 MR. KINGDON: I'm a little unsure if we have 
8 moved — perhaps you can help me, Your Honor. Have we 
9 moved into a child custody proceeding now at these — at 
10 this point? 
11 THE COURT: Well, you know, Mr. Kingdon, the way I 
12 view this is I've already decided the jurisdictional 
13 issue, and you are contesting that. And basically, I'm 
14 letting you put some facts on the record so that you can 
15 appeal this matter and that you'll have some basis for 
16 appeal. 
17 MR. KINGDON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: Otherwise, the appellate courts just 
19 say there's no record and affirm what I do, but I want 
20 to be more than fair to you and — 
21 MR. KINGDON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
22 THE COURT: And I'm basically just trying to get 
23 some information on the record for you, and that's why I 
24 wanted to get the dates down. 
25 MR. KINGDON: Yes, Your Honor. 
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THE COURT: And I think — I really don't think 
there's any contest about the dates. I think both 
parties agree to that. And now that we've done that, 
then, wellf yes, today is — today is the purpose — I 
mean, the purpose of today is for me to decide temporary 
custody, I guess, until a final hearing. 
Now, on the other hand, I'll just tell you if I've 
got two young ladies who are both over the age of 
fourteen or older who are making an election and are 
going to tell me that, then unless you show that she is 
a unfit parent totally unsuitable for custody, then I'm 
going to follow their election. 
MR. KINGDON: Yes, Your Honor, I understand. 
THE COURT: So I really don't need a lot of — I 
mean, you're entitled to ask for it if you want to try 
to prove that she's unfit, but that's what I would 
probably say the law is on this subject right now. 
MR. KINGDON: Your Honor, is there an appropriate 
way for me to ask you what the findings of fact — what 
the findings of fact were regarding — 
THE COURT: Well, I mean, pretty much what the 
findings of fact are going to be is — 
MR. KINGDON: I'm sorry, Your Honor. When you 
spoke with the Honorable Judge Livingston, what the 
findings of fact were. 
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THE COURT: Just — so far there's nothing been any 
surprises of what we conferred about. The same length 
of times were basically — well, maybe a few minor 
discrepancies, but nothing important. We discussed this 
and we looked at the Utah paperwork that had been filed 
there in Utah, and I faxed him the paperwork that had 
been filed here. 
And basically, what he said is that one child has 
moved from place to place, and the other child has 
stayed with Mrs. Kingdon primarily most of the time and 
that — and has been with Mrs. Kingdon since, what, 1999 
here in Georgia for the most part and that — and she 
has had legal custody of Stacy until June or July of 
2002, even though she hasn't had physical custody. 
And we discussed all of that and basically because 
of the two children's situation, he thought that Utah 
should defer to Georgia for jurisdictional purposes, and 
I'm going to say that in my findings of fact. 
MR. KINGDON: Right. My problem, Your Honor, is 
that there's — in both states, there's the statute 
that — 
THE COURT: I'm aware of that, Mr. Kingdon, and I 
believe what the statute says is the judges may allow 
the parties to participate, and if they aren't allowed 
to participate, they're allowed to file paperwork. 
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And the paperwork that we had in Utah that you 
filed and the paperwork that we had here in Georgia that 
Mrs. Kingdon filed was both reviewed by both judges. 
And I know you may have wanted to file more paperwork, 
but the issue really — the issue of the length of the 
children staying is really not in question. I mean, 
that's what both judges had in front of them. 
MR. KINGDON: Right. But at the time, Your Honor, 
I mean, it was obviously — in referring to the 
jurisdictional matter, the — Stacy had been with me for 
longer than six months. Her home state — 
THE COURT: That's correct. We were both aware of 
that. 
MR. KINGDON: Her home state was Utah. 
THE COURT: We were both aware that she had been 
with you longer than six months and the other child had 
been with Mrs. Kingdon since — in Georgia since around 
1999. 
MR. KINGDON: Was there any question about the 
propriety of Utah having entered that modification? 
THE COURT: Well, he had that in front of him and 
we related that back to each other. 
MR. KINGDON: Okay. So in the communication, both 
Courts agreed that Utah had proper jurisdiction to make 
that custody modification? Was that — or was that ever 
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even brought up? 
THE COURT: Well, it was — yeah, and that wasn't 
challenged. This is just — 
MR. KINGDON: That was not challenged? 
THE COURT: No, no. 
MR. KINGDON: Okay. 
THE COURT: There's no — we didn't argue about 
that. I mean, we both understood that Utah had entered 
an order in June — July, is it? 
MR. KINGDON: It was — 
THE COURT: July of 2002. 
MR. KINGDON: June 11th, 2002. 
THE COURT: June 11th of 2002. 
MR. KINGDON: Okay. So there was no question that 
Utah had proper jurisdiction at the time? 
THE COURT: Well, I mean, there's an order. I'm 
not getting into whether they did or didn't. I mean, 
you know, Judge Livingston thought so at the time. 
MR. KINGDON: Right. Okay. 
THE COURT: So I'm not going to — I mean, that 
wasn't a question either. 
MR. KINGDON: All right. 
THE COURT: Now, do you have any more questions for 
Mrs. Kingdon? 
MR. KINGDON: Your Honor, I just — I apologize. 
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1 I've not had an opportunity to be heard by either Court 
2 regarding the jurisdiction, which I — 
3 THE COURT: Well, I'm getting ready to let you 
4 testify. Do you have any more questions for her? 
5 MR. KINGDON: Let's see. 
6 Q (By Mr. Kingdon: ) Linary, were you aware that 
7 there was communication between the Courts regarding 
8 jurisdiction? 
9 A I found out afterwards when my attorney told me. 
10 Q Okay. Did your or your attorney participate in 
11 those communications? 
12 A I didn't. I'm not sure if she did. 
13 MR. KINGDON: Okay. Your Honor, again I'll just 
14 state this before I ask my next question, but again I 
15 feel that these — that this is not the proper forum for 
16 these proceedings and — 
17 THE COURT: All right. Mrs. Kingdon, you can step 
18 down. 
19 (WITNESS WITHDREW FROM THE STAND) 
20 THE COURT: Let's hear from the two children, Ms. 
21 Bolin. Bring — call Stacy or Jennifer (sic) up. 
22 MS. BOLIN: Your Honor, do you want to hear that in 
23 chambers or in open court? 
24 THE COURT: What? 
25 J MS. BOLIN: Do you want to hear that in chambers or 
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open court? 
THE COURT: No. I'll hear it right here. Bring 
Julie up. I mean, I'm just going to ask — that's all 
we're going to ask her. Julie come on up. 
(WITNESS APPROACHES THE WITNESS STAND) 
THE COURT: Raise your i: i ght hand. Be sworn in. 
(JULIE KINGDON IS SWORN BY THE CLERK) 
THE COURT: You can have a seat. 
(WITNESS COMPLIES) 
THE COURT: I'll askyou, Julie — Julie; your 
birthday is July 11th, 1986? 
MS. J. KINGDON: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And where do you wish to reside? With 
your mother or your father? 
MS. J. KINGDON: My mother. 
THE COURT: All right. Thank you. You can have a 
seat. 
(WITNESS WITHDREW FROM THE STAND) 
THE COURT: Stacy, come on up. 
(WITNESS APPROACHES THE WITNESS STAND) 
THE COURT: Raise your right hand. Be sworn in. 
(STACY KINGDON IS SWORN BY THE CLERK) 
THE COURT: Have a seat. 
(WITNESS COMPLIES) 
THE COURT: Stacy, you were born March 5th, 1988? 
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MS. <* , KINGDON: (Nods head) 
THE COURT: You're fourteen years of age? 
MS. S- KINGDON: (Nods head) 
THE COURT: Now, who do you elect to live with? 
Your mother or your father? 
MS, S. KINGDON: My mother. 
THE COURT: Have a seat. 
(WITNESS WITHDREW FROM THE STAND) 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Kingdon — do you have 
any more witnesses, Ms. Bolin? 
MS. BOLIN: No, Your Honor, but I would present to 
the Court a copy of an affidavit of the plaintiff. The 
Court indicated earlier that he did not have one in the 
record. 
THE COURT: I haven't seen it in here. Have you 
given Mr. Kingdon a copy? 
MS. BOLINi Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. KINGDON: I'm sorry, Your Honor. I don't 
know — 
THE COURT: This says it's filed July 10th, so I 
assume it's in here, then. 
THE CLERK: It should be. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, find it for me. 
(CLERK COMPLIES) 
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THE COURT: All right, Mr. Kingdonf do you want to 
testify? 
MR- KINGDON: Yesf Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Come on up. 
(DEFENDANT APPROACHES THE WITNESS STAND) 
THE COURT: Raise your right hand and be sworn in. 
(BRIAN KINGDON IS SWORN BY THE CLERK) 
THE COURT. Have a seat. Say anything you would 
like. Now, what you're doing is talking about 
jurisdiction and the length of the time where the 
children have livedr which we've already agreed on, I 
think, but say anything else you'd like to say. 
MR. KINGDON: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: This is not asking questions. This is 
you testifying, making statements. 
Ml<. KINGDON: This is me testifying. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
MR. KINGDON: Yesf Your Honor. I will attempt to 
primarily address th*1 jurisdictional matter since 
that's — 
THE COURT: I'm going to give you a chance to 
argue. 
MR. KINGDON: Oh. 
THE COURT: This is just your testimony — 
MR. KINGDON: Just my testimony. 
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THE COURT: — about facts, 
MR. KINGDON: Okay. Your Honor, I was married to 
Linary in 1985. We had two children, Julie and Stacy. 
We were divorced in 1989. At that time the divorce was 
done on basically an emergency basis in Kansas because I 
was in the military and T was under orders to go to 
Korea. 
And so there was no — I was under orders to go to 
Korea to an area where I would not be able to have the 
children. So there was no dispute at the time that 
Linary should have the children because I was totally 
going to be unable to have the children. 
Shortly after the divorcef Linary suffered a mental 
and emotional breakdown. She was hospitalized. She was 
diagnosed with bipolar mental disorderf manic depressive 
with paranoia. I was forced to take a hardship 
discharge from the Army in order to take care of the two 
children because she was unable to. 
So they lived with me for a time, and then Linary 
came and picked them — and I moved to Utah. She moved 
out of the — out of Kansas. Neither one of us, to my 
knowledge, has returned to Kansas to live. 
I took the children for a time, then she came and 
picked up the children. And since that time, the 
children have at various times lived with me either at 
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the plaintiff's request — either at Linary's request or 
by mutual agreement• 
Julie has spent a more substantial amount of time 
with me. Most recent — wellf I moved to Utah with the 
children, and then I have resided there ever since 
except for a brief six-month stay in the state of 
Washington in 1996. 
I have — I have been troubled throughout the years 
by difficulties in dealing with the plaintiff. Her 
diagnosed mental disorder has made it difficult to make 
agreements and hold to those agreements with her and 
deal with the children. 
The children have — like I saidf have gone back 
and forth, and Julie has spent more time with — much 
more time with me than Stacy. I believe that through 
the mother's influence, in large measure, the reason 
that Stacy does not wish to reside with me has a lot to 
do with the influence that her mother has had on her. 
There are some specific things that I learned when 
Stacy was here this last time from July 17th of 2001 to 
May of 2002, regarding things that she says that her 
mother has told her about me and so forth. I have 
brought copies of some of the things that both Julie and 
Stacy have written in this regard. 
The charges of child abuse are really nothing new. 
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Most every time the children have been with me, when 
they have returned to their motherf she has called me 
and said — basically told me that while the children 
were with me, that they were neglected, abused, and so 
forth. This is just the first time that this has— 
this has come before the Court, these charges. 
I — in my answer to this court, I have denied most 
of the charges that Linary has made. I do — I do admit 
that there was arguing in my home in Utah, but I do not 
believe that the arguments were in the nature of abuse 
to Stacy in any way. 
A lot of Stacy's and Linary's testimony regarding 
this matter are distortions of facts or just outright 
lies. Stacy has stated that she cut her wrists. If she 
were to come up in front of this Court and hold up her 
wrists to the Court, the Court would see no evidence of 
scarring or anything like that. 
She has said that while she was with me that she 
contemplated suicide. I have no knowledge of that. I 
do know that in a journal entry that she made concerning 
her mother — in a journal entry, Stacy stated that she 
thought that she was depressed and that her mother was 
going to commit suicide. 
I believe that it is in Stacy's best interest to 
remain in Utah. She has more structure there. I 
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ll understand that while she's here, she's allowed to do a 
2 lot of things that she simply would not be allowed to do 
3 if she were with myself and my wife in Utah. 
4 And I'm very concerned for both of my daughters. I 
5 want what's best for them. I am in no way an abusive 
6 parent. I've been charged with physical abuse of the 
7 children. Both children could tell this Court or anyone 
8 that I have never physically abused them, and I find 
9 such allegations offensive and repugnant. 
10 I could address more why I think that Linary is an 
11 unfit mother, but it seems that the intention of this 
12 Court is to give the children their choice of who they 
13 want to live with. That who they want to live with, 
14 and I understand that, based an what little I know of 
15 Georgia law, that that pretty much follows the provision 
16 of law. 
17 And I do not want to turn this court into a forum 
18 for showing, you know, who the better parent is or why I 
19 think that — why that I think that the mother is really 
20 not fitted to have Stacy, again, in large measure, 
21 because I don't believe that the proper forum to hear 
22 those issues is here. I think that pretty much covers 
23 things. 
24 THE COURT: Any questions, Ms. Bolin? 
25 I CROSS-EXAMINATION OF BRIAN KINGDON 
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1 BY MS, BOLIN; 
2 Q Mr. Kingdonf are you employed? 
3 A I am not currently employed. 
4 Q When was the last time you were employed? 
b A I was laid off at the very end of last year, so 
6 December 31st. 
7 Q What kind of educational background do you have? 
8 A I have . degree in — a Bachelor's degree in 
9 psychology and also a Bachelor's degree in accounting. 
10 MS. BOLIN: That's all, Your Honor. 
11 THE COURT: You may have a seat. 
12 (DEFENDANT WITHDRAWS FROM THE STAND) 
13 THE COURT: I'll give you the opening and 
14 concluding argument, Ms. Bolin. 
15 MS. BOLIN: Your Honor, I'll go ahead and just 
16 quickly reiterate that jurisdiction has been placed with 
17 the Georgia courts. Our petition here is based on a 
18 significant change in circumstances once the child 
19 returned from Utah and came to Georgia. 
20 Based on the allegations set forth in the verified 
21 pleadings and based on their testimony here today, I 
22 would submit that Georgia is, in fact, the proper forum 
23 and that these children — both girls should be entitled 
24 under Georgia law to choose where they wish to reside. 
25 And I think they've made it clear that they wish to 
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reside in Georgia with their mother, and I would 
respectfully submit to the Court that that is where they 
need to be. 
THE COURT: Mr. Kingdon? 
MR. KINGDON: Your Honor, again I do not believe 
that this is the proper forum for this hearing. I 
believe that it is in the best interest of Stacy Marie 
Kingdon that she remain in Utah in accordance with the 
agreement that the mother made that she should remain 
there and that I should have custody. 
I do not believe that the mother is particularly 
fit. I believe that she is not capable or willing to 
understand how her mental disorders affect her children 
or what her negative influence on them is regarding 
their relationship with me. And I believe that the— 
this matter should — I believe that this Court should 
revisit — look at again how this Court came to this 
basis. 
It troubles me, Your Honor — it troubles me that 
charges of child abuse have been made, but not at any 
point — and because of those charges of child abuse, 
because that was raised, this case has been moved from 
Utah, which had proper jurisdiction, down to this court. 
Yet the plaintiff has not at any point given this 
Court any real substantial evidence that there was child 
40 
abuse. And to me, it seems like a violation of my right 
to due process that I have been accused of child abuse 
and never been given opportunity to present facts 
regarding that. 
The case has been moved based on that. Yet here in 
this court, that really does not seem to matter under 
Georgia law. This is a matter of — the fact that I'm 
a — I'm a citizen of the United States. I'm entitled 
to due process under the law whether I'm in Utah or 
Georgia, anywhere. 
And allegations have been raised and my — the 
circumstances of my family have been greatly altered 
without having to substantiate any of those claims, and 
that truly bothers me that that is how this is being 
handled. And again, that's why I believe that this 
court is not the proper forum for this. 
THE COURT: Ms. Bolin, anything further? 
MS. BOLIN: No, Your Honor. Thank you. 
THE COURT: All right. I'll find that the parties 
were divorced September 11th, 1989, in Kansas; that 
joint custody of both children was awarded to Linary 
Kingdon — I mean, Linary — joint custody to both 
parties was awarded on September 11th, 1989, with 
physical custody with Linary Kingdon; that Stacy Marie 
Kingdon lived with her father from June 1994 through 
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1 December 1994f from August 1996 to May 1997f from August 
2 1999 through December 1999, and from July 17th, 2001 to 
3 June 4th, 2002; that there was a June 11th, 2002 consent 
4 order entered into Utah changing custody from Stacy 
5 (sic) to Brian Kingdon; that on — now, that was with 
6 Stacy. 
7 Now, as far as Julie goes, she's lived with the 
8 mother basically for the last five years, and the mother 
9 has resided in Georgia with a brief stay in — 
10 MR. KINGDON: Your Honor? 
11 THE COURT: What? 
12 MR. KINGDON: I'm sorry. Julie has not resided 
13 with her mother for the past five years. 
14 THE COURT: Well, you said she's briefly stayed 
15 with you some. 
16 MR. KINGDON: She's stayed — Julie has stayed with 
17 me much more than Stacy. You have the dates for Stacy. 
18 I gave those — 
19 THE COURT: Yes. 
20 MR. KINGDON: I gave those dates because of the— 
21 of the matter of me having custody of Stacy according to 
22 Utah, but Julie has not lived with her mother for the 
23 past five years. I'm sorry. 
24 THE COURT: Well, Ms. Bolin, when has Julie stayed 
25 with the mother? 
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MS. BOLIN: Your Honor, just a second. 
(MS. BOLIN CONFERS BRIEFLY WITH THE PLAINTIFF) 
MS. BOLIN: Your Honor, the physical custody has 
always been with the mother until June 11th of this 
year. The children lived intermittently with both 
parents. 
And to actually establish how much time was spent 
in both homes, I don't have that information readily 
available, but we can have — 
THE COURT: Where has Julie lived for the last 
three years since Mrs. Kingdon returned to Georgia, 
1999? 
MRS. KINGDON: When Stacy and I returned to 
Georgia, Julie was with her dad, but then four months 
later she came to visit, didn't want to go back and has 
been with me then — so that would have been December 
three years ago. 
THE COURT: December of 1999? 
MRS. KINGDON: Correct. 
THE COURT: And she's been with you since? 
MRS. KINGDON: Correct. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. KINGDON: She has resided — she resided with 
me before December of 1999, and in December of 1999, she 
stayed here with her in — 
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THE COURT: All right. I'll find that as far as 
Julie is concerned that the mother has always had 
physical custody of her and that's never changed as far 
as legal physical custody, and that from December of 
1999 until today's date she's resided with the mother in 
Georgia. 
I'll find that on July — let's see — that o n — 
what did I say? June 11th, 2002, the Utah court entered 
an order, consent order, between the parties giving 
physical custody of Stacy to Mr. Kingdon; that o n — 
that the child came to visit supposedly for one month, I 
believe, by agreement of the parties in July. Is that 
right? Was it July or June? 
MRS. KINGDON: June 4th, she — 
MR. KINGDON: June 4th is when she came. 
THE COURT: June 4 th, for one month, but then 
expressed a desire to stay and did stay despite Mr. 
Kingdon's objections; that on July 3rd, 2002, Mrs. 
Kingdon filed a motion for ex-parte relief and also 
seeking a petition for modification of the Utah order 
and also stated that there was a jurisdictional dispute; 
that Judge Livingston, superior court judge of Utah, and 
myself conferred by phone. 
We reviewed the Utah paperwork that had been filed. 
We reviewed the Georgia paperwork that had been filed. 
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We discussed this matter. We exchanged faxes of the 
different paperwork that had been filed. 
Judge Livingston declined to exercise Utah 
jurisdiction and agreed that Georgia was the home state 
of both children because of significant contacts and the 
best interest of the children and emergency action 
needed and that he entered a Utah order; and that on 
July 8th, 2002, I entered an order giving Georgia — no 
August 5th, 2002, I entered an order determining that 
both children — the forum for determining custody of 
both minor children, Stacy and Julie, was properly 
vested with the state of Georgia and that Georgia was 
the home state as far as jurisdictional purposes. 
And then based on the election of both children 
being over the age of fourteen, I grant temporary 
custody with the mother, Linary Kingdon, of both 
children at this time. 
Ms. Bolin, you draw up and order and, Mr. Kingdon, 
you can now review your legal options based on this 
order once it's signed. 
Now, Ms. Bolin, I want you to give Mr. Kingdon 
either a fax or copy him the order as soon as you get it 
prepared and I've signed it. Make sure he gets that as 
soon as possible. Do you have his address — 
MS. BOLIN: Yes, Your Honor. 
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THE COURT: — and/or fax number? 
MS. BOLIN: Yes. 
THE COURT: Anything else you want to say, Mr. 
Kingdon? Any questions? 
MR. KINGDON: Yes, Your Honor. Was there — was 
there some sort of record kept of the communication 
between you and Judge Livingston? 
THE COURT: Ms. Kennedy, have you got a card for 
Mr. Kingdon? 
COURT REPORTER: You mean today? 
MR. KINGDON: No, the conversation that Judge 
Livingston had with — 
THE COURT: No, there wasn't any record. 
MR. KINGDON: There was not any record kept of 
that? 
THE COURT: No. 
MR. KINGDON: And then I don't — I'm sorry. I 
don't know Georgia law, but I would like to enter my 
notice to appeal the decision of this Court. 
THE COURT: You're acting as your own attorney, Mr. 
Kingdon, so you'll figure out — you can figure out what 
to do. 
MR. KINGDON: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: But Ms. Kennedy will give you her card. 
MR. KINGDON: Thank you. 
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THE COURT: And I'll note for the record that my 
court reporter is giving you her card at this time. 
(COURT REPORTER CONFERS BRIEFLY WITH MR. 
KINGDON) 
THE COURT: All right. Thank y'all very much. 
You're free to go. 
MR. KINGDON: Thank you, Your Honor. 
(HEARING CONCLUDED, 10:32 a.m.) 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF GEORGIA, 
COUNTY OF WARE: 
I hereby certify the foregoing hearing, pages 1 through 
47, represents a true and complete transcription of the 
testimony reported by me on August 19, 2002. 
I further certify I have no interest in the outcome of 
this case, and I am neither kin nor counsel to any party. 
I further certify I have not entered into any 
contractual agreements with any party involved in this case. 
This certification is expressly withdrawn and denied 
upon the disassembly or photocopying of the foregoing 
transcript of the proceedings or any part thereof, including 
exhibits, unless disassembly or photocopying is executed by 
the undersigned certified court reporter. 
This, the 20th day of November 2002. 
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